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5Foreword
Ever since the 2011 ‘Arab Spring’ erupted, many places in the Middle East 
and North Africa have been in crisis. Often, these crises are explained with 
 references to Islam, for example to the Sunni-Shia divide, or Islamic extrem-
ism sponsored from Saudi Arabia or Iran. Such explanations are often one-
sided and superficial, and in the public debate well-informed balanced views 
of what goes on beneath the surface are rare. Graham Fuller is an excep-
tion. His vast experience in the Middle East and subsequent writing projects 
have made him a highly respected scholar and speaker on political Islam 
and the Middle East in a wide sense. In Spring 2016 he came to Leiden at our 
 invitation to give a series of lectures which formed the basis of this book. The 
lectures attracted many students, academics, government officials and NGO 
activists and led to lively discussions and new insights for those present. We 
are confident that this book will also finds its way to a wide readership. 
Jan Michiel Otto Van Vollenhoven Petra Sijpesteijn
Institute for Law, Leiden – Center for the study
Governance, and Society of Islam and Society 
VVI LUCIS
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9Power and Identity in Muslim World Politics
PART ONE: NON-RELIGIOUS CONSIDERATIONS  
IN THE POLITICS OF SHARI’A
What is the appropriate role, if any, of Shari’a law in the politics and govern-
ance of the Muslim world? This question occupies a major place in the polit-
ical thinking of all Muslims, regardless of their response. It is also a focus of 
Western academic study as more Muslims migrate to the West, many with 
positive views of the place of Shari’a in Muslim life.
The West may find the centrality of the Shari’a issue to be difficult to under-
stand, viewing it as if it represents some kind of throwback to seemingly 
“medieval” conceptions of law linked to religion. Yet within the Muslim 
world the reasons for the importance of Shari’a are not hard to discern. First 
of all—unlike in the West where Shari’a as a body of religious principles and 
rulings is perceived by many as dated, negative, and inappropriate to a more 
modern and secular world—in the Muslim world the concept of Shari’a is a 
strongly positive one. The word Shari’a itself derives from the Arabic root for 
“path” or “way”; it suggests a broad and generalized notion resembling in 
part the use of the term “The Way” in other religious traditions, including 
Christianity and Buddhism. It represents a quest to create a society in which 
people live in accordance with God’s will and law, thereby perhaps attaining 
divine grace. In this sense, then, Shari’a can be perceived as above all a con-
cept, something more than just a specific body of prescriptive laws. As such, 
Muslims see Shari’a as representing the core of their faith, an expression of 
the moral and legal framework within which to live on earth. For most Mus-
lims it represents a positive virtue worthy of embracing. 
Shari’a, therefore, represents the core of Islamic faith and culture that 
seeks to codify the principles of the Islamic faith as derived from its two key 
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sources: the Qur’an and the Hadith. The Qur’an of course represents direct 
divine revelation to the Prophet Muhammad; it particularly treats such 
grand issues as the nature of God, as well as the nature of relations between 
God and Man. Doing so, it offers only limited guidance by way of specifics on 
law or governance. The Hadith, on the other hand, represent an attempt to 
recall and record the words and the deeds of the Prophet during his lifetime 
as leader of the new Muslim community. It deals with the experience of the 
Prophet in executing early governance in accordance with his understand-
ing of the Qur’an. In this sense the Hadith are much more specific on issues 
of social organization and governance than the Qur’an, though not yet fully 
codified into law. The words and deeds of the Prophet were recorded perhaps 
beginning only one hundred years after the Prophet’s death; as a result there 
has always been some degree of legal controversy about the accuracy of what 
was ultimately recorded.
So what, then, is Shari’a? Shari’a could be best defined as a human (not 
divine) process on the part of Islamic scholars to codify a legal system based 
on the divine sources of the Qur’an and the non-divine records of Hadith. It 
is a flexible and living tradition as interpreted (in differing ways) by Shari’a 
courts across the Muslim world. 
Now, Shari’a law—indeed any body of law—cannot be implemented with-
out the existence of a State of some kind. A State implies the existence of 
authority, a body capable of determining the legal interpretations of Shari’a, 
in addition to possessing the power to impose it upon society. The full adop-
tion and application of Shari’a is, at least in principle, a key goal of most 
Islamist movements and Islamic parties.
As Professor Jan Michiel Otto has pointed out, there are at least two aspects 
to Shari’a: First is the realm of personal law that involves issues of personal 
behavior, private morality, family law relating to marriage, divorce, sexual-
ity, hygiene, issues of inheritance, and the like. The implementation of var-
ious aspects of personal law—in different ways depending upon locale and 
tradition—has a long history in Muslim societies. Traditionally, its valid-
ity finds fairly ready acceptance within Muslim societies, even if its actual 
details might be disputed and/or evolving. The second aspect of Shari’a is its 
relationship to the State, involving issues of state powers, lawmaking, legis-
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lation, citizenship, public morality, relations with other states both Muslim 
and non-Muslim, and the place of minorities and non-Muslims.
As in so many things, once we move beyond the conceptual and philosoph-
ical understanding of Shari’a and delve into details, areas of controversy 
emerge. Furthermore, as the politics around the adoption of Shari’a evolve, it 
becomes evident that far more than mere religious factors are involved in the 
debate around the place of Shari’a.
* * *
There is a large body of scholarship dealing with the religious and theologi-
cal aspects of Shari’a and its historical evolution. Human society being what 
it is, however, a large number of non-religious factors likewise influence the 
politics surrounding the role of Shari’a and its adoption in Muslim societies. 
This essay seeks to examine some of the key non-religious factors that impact 
the perception and role of Shari’a in the politics of the Muslim world as well 
as the life of Muslims in the West. I focus particular attention here upon the 
factors of identity politics and power relations in Muslim thinking about Isla-
mism and Islamist politics.
In these regards, further definition is in order. I define Islamism (and, conse-
quently, Islamists) rather broadly—consistent, in my view, with the reality of 
its many varieties on the ground. Thus, an Islamist is someone who believes 
that the Qur’an and the Hadith have vital things to say about Islamic society 
and governance, and who seeks to apply these concepts in some way to soci-
ety and governance.
The breadth of this definition therefore embraces a spectrum of Muslim polit-
ical thinking and practice from the moderate to the radical, the conservative 
to the liberal, the contemporary to the traditional, the non-violent to the vio-
lent; it further recognizes degrees of acceptance of elements of democratic 
principles in contemporary governance. Naturally, discussion of the place of 
Shari’a figures immediately into such a range of considerations. Moreover, 
how the principles of Shari’a should be introduced into governance becomes 
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a natural topic of debate: whether it should be via force, by exhortation 
(da’wa), through a political party, or by way of an ideological movement. 
Some neo-conservative (even Islamophobic) ideological thinkers in the West 
such as Daniel Pipes in the US, Martin Kramer in Israel, Geert Wilders in 
the Netherlands, or Ayaan Ali Hirsi, treat Islamism as being by definition a 
distinctly dangerous phenomenon that needs to be eliminated; for them 
Islamism is synonymous with fascism, aggression, violence, and dictator-
ship. While these features can and indeed have characterized some Islamist 
movements, the spectrum of Islamist movements is far broader than these 
narrow and frozen characterizations. They leave no room for political and 
intellectual evolution—the heart of the issue in analyzing contemporary Isla-
mism. Indeed, we cannot analytically end up characterizing Islamism by 
definition in strictly negative terms; some Islamist parties have had some 
real successes and show encouraging ideological evolution. These move-
ments cannot be excluded from the spectrum of Islamism simply because 
they do not meet the negative criteria cited above.
Islamism also deserves a great deal of attention simply because it is the sin-
gle most important movement for change and reform in the Muslim world; 
no other movements rival it in numerical support. The reasons are clear: Isla-
mists have been the overwhelmingly dominant group in Muslim society who 
have criticized the shortcomings of existing regimes in the Muslim world, 
especially for regime failure to implement Islamic values and Islamic law, 
for their corruption, frequent hypocrisy in their lifestyles (especially in Saudi 
Arabia), oppression, absence of social justice, and subservience to the West. 
They have demanded reforms and spoken out against rulers. They have been 
arrested, imprisoned, tortured, executed, silenced over many decades and 
hence have acquired a degree of credibility and respect that few other polit-
ical leaders have ever attained. They furthermore speak in the vocabulary 
of Muslim culture, the familiar cultural framework of Muslim society—and 
not within some Western framework of political values. They have above all 
acquired a degree of trust within large elements of Muslim society. 
The Functional Characteristics of Islamism
Islamists are thus active participants within society—and in politics, where 
permitted. Their ideologies aside, though, what are the main functional char-
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acteristics of Islamist action within society and politics? (Not all Islamists will 
necessarily agree on these goals, but these objectives tend to predominate. 
In addition, this list is not necessarily by prioritization.)
First, Islamists seek the elimination of regimes not viewed as properly 
Islamic on the basis of the many criticisms leveled against such regimes over 
the years. There is no consensus among Islamists on how to get rid of such 
regimes—whether by democratic process (if such exists and could actually 
implement change), or through social movements to pressure regimes, or 
through acts of violence that would overthrow such regimes. (We should 
also note that tactical disagreement on these issues also characterizes 
non-Islamic political opposition as well.)
Clearly any effort to bring about regime change entails great risks to the 
actors involved, particularly if they contemplate using force. And many have 
advocated the use of force in the past, either because peaceful or democratic 
means were of no avail against harsh and authoritarian regimes, or because 
they rejected the democratic process on principle.
Second, nearly all Islamist movements speak of the need to establish an 
Islamic State. But the term is rarely defined in any meaningful way, except 
to refer to application of Shari’a law as a key litmus test. Even here, however, 
different formulations are used: Is Shari’a to be understood as the primary 
source of legislation, or as the sole source of legislation, or as one (of many) 
source(s) of legislation? Among these formulations there is much room for 
interpretation. Of course even “application of Shari’a” is itself an imprecise 
term. Yet advocating the establishment of an “Islamic State” seems to be a 
nominal prerequisite for most but not all Islamist movements. 
Third, some Islamist movements aspire to restore the institution of the Cali-
phate. Indeed, the Caliphate is viewed by most Muslims as richly symbolic 
of the unity and power of Islamic authority across Islamic history. “Caliph” 
(Khalifa in Arabic) simply means “successor”—in this case denoting the suc-
cessor to the Prophet after his death; yet in this case “successor” is under-
stood not as a prophet (for there can be no more prophets in Islam) but as 
leader of the new Muslim community and state in the years after the  Prophet’s 
death. The institution of the Caliphate has risen and fallen in significance in 
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Islamic history, disappearing over certain periods, while strongly resusci-
tated later in the Ottoman Empire as an expression of the centralized reli-
gious authority of the Ottomans.
It is significant that in 1923 Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the new 
Turkish Republic, abolished the office of the Caliphate as an institution no 
longer of value to his aspirations for a strictly secular Turkey. Nonetheless, 
Turkey had no real “right” to abolish the office simply because Caliphs had 
resided in Turkey for the last several hundred years. It was as if the prime 
minister of Italy would one day arbitrarily decide to abolish the Papacy on his 
own, without consultation or consideration of the views of tens of millions 
of Catholics around the world who would not agree to the step. The abolition 
of the Caliphate was thus perceived by many Muslims as shocking, illegal 
and damaging to the worldwide Islamic community (or “umma”).
Some Islamists still see the eventual restoration of the office of the Cali-
phate as a significant symbol of progress towards Islamic unity. Such an 
office could also provide a centralized religious focus (as with the Pope in 
Christianity), a place where authoritative religious pronouncements could 
be made on behalf of the umma. Yet most Muslims also recognize that the 
problems of resuscitating the Caliphate today are daunting. Who would 
he be, how would he be selected, what would be his authorities over Mus-
lims, how binding would his religious interpretations be, what would be the 
nature of his authorities over Muslim heads of state in other countries, or 
over other national clerics and muftis? Achieving consensus on these ques-
tions is nearly impossible today.
Several Islamist movements, most notably the “Islamic State” (Da’ish, ISIS, 
ISIL), advocate the restoration of the Caliphate—and ISIS actually did pro-
claim that restoration on its own territory. Other groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir 
(Hizb al-Tahrir or Liberation Party) have drawn up lengthy blueprints for 
the establishment of a Caliphate, though not yet implemented. Few Muslim 
states have advocated strongly for the restoration of the office as a priority 
for the Muslim world. Nonetheless, the concept has considerable emotional 
and cultural resonance among Muslims, at least in the abstract. Note how 
visibly the office has been politically exploited by the “Islamic State” to draw 
the attention of Muslims.
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A fourth issue with which Islamist parties and movements struggle relates 
to the complex relationship between Islam, the state, and nationalism. 
Islam is quite clear about its negative views of tribalism, nationalism, or any 
other cohesive identity that might overshadow Islamic solidarity—at least 
in principle. The totality of the world Muslim community, the umma, rep-
resents the ultimate ideal to which Muslims should aspire. Anything that 
weakens, dilutes, or divides Muslim unity—ethnicity, tribes, states, clans, 
languages—is undesirable, at least in principle. 
Still, the reality of human history is that warring states have always existed, 
before Islam and during the Islamic era, regardless of religion. What is the 
basis of that conflict? To put it another way, should nationalism always be 
viewed as a negative characteristic in Islam? Is it negative, when nationalism 
is turned against non-Muslim enemies (such as US occupational forces in 
Iraq since 2003), for example, or where it functions in support of a Muslim 
population against a non-Muslim force? And what happens when Muslim 
states are at war with each other? Certainly the state-supported ‘ulama (cler-
ics) have readily found reason why their own state is more Islamically or ide-
ologically just than the enemy state. Yet the contradiction between Islamic 
unity and local nationalism remains. Indeed, if Islamic unity is the indis-
putable ideal, there should not even exist an array of separate and distinct 
“Islamic states”; nonetheless separate states remain the reality. Many of 
the ‘ulama in India, for instance, opposed the creation of a separate Muslim 
breakaway state of Pakistan in 1947, precisely because it weakened Muslim 
unity, even if Pakistan could be an essentially “all-Muslim” state. 
The tension between Islam and nationalism will never disappear, especially 
in the face of Muslim aspiration to greater unity. What, for example, should 
Muslims make of the phenomenon of Arab nationalism, or pan-Arabism? 
Many Arabs have instinctively felt that pan-Arabism is a desirable goal, the 
unity of all Arabic-speaking peoples, from Iraq to Morocco. Indeed, from 
an Islamic point of view, it does represent a “higher” ideal than mere local 
state nationalism. Yet Islamic movements have tended to view pan-Arabism 
negatively. Here the struggle was not usually a theoretical one about Islam 
versus nationalism, as much as it was shaped by the hostile attitude of Arab 
nationalist regimes towards Islamist movements that they viewed as rivals 
or a threat. In reality, then, political tensions—struggles over power—have 
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been great between Islamists and Arab nationalists over much of the modern 
period. Indeed, Arab nationalists (or any nationalists) tend to be more “sec-
ular” in character than Islamist movements, although there is no absolute 
ideological need to exclude Islam as a cultural value for Arab nationalists. 
From a Western perspective Arab nationalism (much less concepts of 
Islamic solidarity) has been viewed in largely negative terms for two rea-
sons. One is an instinctive Western fear of the emergence of stronger power 
blocs in the Muslim world, which could challenge or hinder Western geopo-
litical ambitions for control. Second, such Islamist or even Arab nationalist 
state attempts have generally failed—even while creating much temporary 
regional sympathy—due to political inexperience and bad governance. This 
poor experience in governance by Arab nationalists is due more to the lack of 
political experience across the region as a whole (partly a product of colonial 
domination for long periods) than it is determined by the guiding ideology 
itself. 
Even so, there is something of a contradiction here. At a time when Europe is 
striving towards regional unity in the form of the EU (a higher level of organ-
ization than the nation-state), the West has opposed and mocked any Arab 
or Muslim attempts to achieve the same. Islamists will continue to face the 
problem of the “illegitimacy” of the Muslim “nation-state” against the aspi-
rational goal of a united umma. Yet how can the West keep peddling the tired 
European nation-state model (and source of violent European wars) as an 
alternative to multi-ethnic and multi-religious Muslim states at this point? 
Surely Muslim aspirations towards greater political unity should be equally 
viewed as an inherently positive goal, rather than an undesirable one.
Fifth, Islamist movements generally take the lead in fighting Western domi-
nation—military, political, cultural—in the Muslim world. They are not alone 
in this regard: Nationalism in Muslim countries has always resisted foreign 
power and domination, as we see in the history of innumerable Muslim coun-
tries from Algeria to Indonesia. Islamists share this anti-imperial goal no less 
enthusiastically than (secular) nationalist movements in the region.
In the Islamist struggle against Western colonialism (or Chinese or Russian 
colonialism) some movements—such as al-Qa’ida and, later, the “Islamic 
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State” (Da’ish)—have taken the struggle one critical step further by opting to 
carry the armed struggle into the Western homelands themselves. In doing 
so these movements of course instantly qualify as “terrorist” in the West, 
crossing a threshold that even local resistance to Western occupying forces 
has not done.
Sixth, Islamist movements over a century have increasingly been coming to 
terms with the challenge from democracy as a governing principle or ide-
ology. Here contradictions abound, however, as we will discuss in greater 
detail below. If the basis of Shari’a is fundamentally divine (to the extent 
it derives from revelation), then codified law derived from the Shari’a (fiqh) 
cannot be reduced to the outcome of human debate and legislation. Leg-
islators in an Islamic state cannot simply decide that it is “permissible” to 
sell or consume alcohol—or, similarly, to permit the use of interest. In this 
case, “Man” does not have the right to overturn “God’s laws.” Thus Islamic 
democracies (or partial democracies like Iran or Pakistan) have established 
High Shari’a Councils or courts that in effect pass on the Islamic legitimacy 
of a given piece of parliamentary legislation. (In principle this resembles the 
institution, say, of the US Supreme Court, which passes on the constitution-
ality of legislation from the US Congress, although religion is not supposed 
to figure in such decisions—even though it might influence the decisions of 
individual justices.)
Even where Islamists sometimes feel uncomfortable with granting too much 
authority to the electorate or to an elected legislature, many of them com-
ment on one obvious benefit of a democratic system: The people can actually 
get rid of a ruler who is no longer wanted. Islam may teach that rulers, to be 
legitimate, must be “just” and consult with the people (among other quali-
fications), yet there are no provisions for removing the unjust ruler. Indeed, 
‘ulama who in principle might be qualified to pass on the Islamic legitimacy 
of a ruler or his policies at any time in history, might find it dangerous to 
their health to declare a ruler “un-Islamic” and worthy of overthrow. 
In practice, then, Islamists have increasingly come to accept many of the 
basic principles of democracy as desirable in Islamic states, although the 
devil is in the details, of course. Movements like the Muslim Brotherhood 
have long been active in trade union politics and elections, as well as in other 
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professional organizations. They have often gone beyond that involvement 
to participate in legislative politics in Egypt, Palestine (Hamas), Jordan, 
Yemen, Iraq, Tunisia (Ennahda), Morocco, Algeria, Pakistan, and elsewhere. 
Salafi movements have long reviled democracy and elections as un-Islamic 
and a Western innovation, yet they changed their tune in Egypt in 2012, for 
example. When it became obvious, that is, that national elections would be 
the new forum in which a new national struggle for power would be enacted, 
they thereupon decided to participate in elections. The same happened in 
Pakistan. When democracy becomes a key channel to power, most Islamists 
end up choosing to participate. The lessons gained from that experience 
alone are invaluable and key to arguments about processes of evolution 
within political Islam.
As Islamist (or, less ideologically, Islamic) movements become an inevitable 
part of the Muslim political scene, we witness the emergence of ever less 
violent, even forward-looking movements on the Islamic political spectrum. 
Since 2003 the ruling Justice and Progress Party (AKP) in Turkey has been 
highly effective and quite remarkable in its accomplishments in its first dec-
ade—arguably the most effective in modern Turkish democratic history. 
That progress came about despite the current major mistakes the AKP has 
made since 2013, when after ten years it has grown corrupt and its leader has 
adopted a markedly authoritarian style (even though still elected to office). 
In addition, the Hizmet (Service) movement in Turkey (not a political party), 
founded by Fethullah Gülen, is a remarkable civil Islamic movement—one 
of the largest, most progressive, and tolerant movements anywhere in the 
Muslim world. It emphasizes religious tolerance, inter-civilizational dialog, 
and the overwhelming need for modern scientific education—more schools 
rather than more mosques to best serve the Muslim world.
The Role of Power Relationships in Advocacy of Shari’a
There are at least two distinct dynamics of political Islam (and advocacy 
of Shari’a): Islamist parties out of power, who seek participation in the sys-
tem (power); and Islamist parties in power, who want to retain power. Such 
dynamics are common to all political systems and hardly unique to Isla-
mist parties, but Islamist parties bring special ideological considerations to 
bear.
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The question of Shari’a and its place in governance is heavily influenced by 
the power dynamic involved: Are Islamists seeking to gain entry into the 
system (power), or to maintain power (their position in the system)? Isla-
mists out of power brandish Shari’a and the Islamic agenda as a weapon 
against entrenched authoritarian regimes, which the Islamists charge with 
being non-Islamic, that is, illegitimate. How does an entrenched regime 
fight against the charge of being non-Islamic, except by challenging or elim-
inating the Islamists leveling the charge? Yet harsh treatment of the Islamic 
opposition can be dangerous when the regime’s very legitimacy is in ques-
tion in the minds of the public, who might then lend street support to the 
Islamic challengers (as happened during the Arab Spring in Tunisia, Egypt, 
Libya, and Syria). 
Power and Change in Government
In the West we routinely place much emphasis upon the rule of law and the 
need to follow constitutional procedure in any change of government. In 
societies and polities with relatively new and fragile governing procedures, 
however, the issue of the rule of law is not as simple as its mere evocation 
would seem. Whose rule of law? And the rule of whose law? How were the rules 
of the game established? By whom, and with whose interests at stake? What 
if the rules of the game seem to be unfair and disadvantage any new con-
tenders for power? How can or should the rules of the game be changed? All 
these questions pose issues that are a recipe for instability and for the poten-
tial use of violence in changing the system—especially when the system may 
indeed not be “fair” or provide a level playing field for other players. Glib 
Western references to “rule of law,” then, often miss the point.
Such was the case with the government of Muhammad al-Morsi, elected in 
2012 in the first presidential elections in the history of Egypt. A broad variety 
of differing judgments concerning the character of his year in office exist. 
Yet it is not simply a question of assessing his rule—his legitimately elected 
government was overthrown by a military coup one year later—but the con-
ditions under which his rule took place. The constitution was still in the pro-
cess of being written; the rules of the game themselves were under contention. 
So simple appeal to “rule of law” provides very little answer to these ques-
tions. Each side sought to write a constitution and create rules of the game 
that inevitably favored their own party. How do power relations change, 
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or are they changed, under such circumstances? Power, often raw power, 
determines these questions of “rule of law.” Who controls the ministries of 
power: military, intelligence, security, police? (Morsi, even as president, did 
not). Moreover, how are the rules applied, and in support of whose interests? 
If there are rules, who will enforce the rules, and how?
In examining the major cases of when Islamist parties have come to power 
in the Middle East over the past few decades, this precise question imme-
diately emerges: How did they come to power? At least six of the following 
quite diverse cases with Islamist movements have gone on to establish an 
“Islamic State.” 
- The Saudi State: The present Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has of course been 
in existence for over a century. It does not officially designate itself as an 
Islamic State, but does claim that its sole constitution is the Qur’an. It 
applies Shari’a law fairly strictly in accordance with an ultra-conservative 
school of  Wahhabism, or Salafism. It came to power via an armed mujahi-
din movement that conquered the central region and, through political alli-
ances, spread its conquests across the country and beyond. Still, this case is 
not, properly speaking, an example of modern Islamism, although the Saudi 
state is undeniably a form of “Islamic State.”
- The Iranian Revolution of 1979 came to power amidst a genuine social rev-
olution and drawn-out civil chaos, involving multiple parties across a political 
spectrum that contested for power—royalists, socialists, communists, 
nationalists, and Islamists. In the end, the Islamists outmaneuvered all their 
opponents and gained power, notably the more hard-line Islamist faction 
dominated by Ayatollah Khomeini. Here the Islamists achieved power 
through manipulation of a chaotic political scene in a revolutionary context. 
The Khomeini government maintained a uniquely revolutionary interpreta-
tion of (Shi’ite) Islam. 
- Sudan: Sudanese Islamists came to power in 1989 via a bloodless military coup 
backed by a group that would call itself The National Islamic Front. This 
Front is the ruling party in what is essentially a one-party state—the Repub-
lic of Sudan. Although Sudan does not officially declare itself an Islamic 
State, it has declared that Shari’a is the foundation of national law, and it 
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applies it in varying ways. Prominent Islamists have played major roles in all 
levels of state politics.
- Afghanistan: The Taliban came to power in 1996 by military means in a civil 
war. They crushed other Islamist movements and militias that had nearly 
destroyed the country in a previous eight-year civil war among Islamist mili-
tias. The Taliban brought peace and order, declared the Islamic Emirate 
of Afghanistan and imposed strict Shari’a law, until the regime was over-
thrown by US forces in 2001. 
- Turkey: The AKP (Justice and Development Party)—the current ruling 
party (as of 2016)—represents a highly moderate Islamist party even though 
it does not designate itself as such. Rather, it declares itself to be a socially 
conservative democratic party. The party itself disavows any Islamist label 
(partly due to Turkish constitutional prohibitions) but emerges from a long 
succession of variously suppressed Islamist/Islamic parties over the past 
several decades. It achieved power through honest democratic elections and 
went on to win three successive, fair national elections. It is the first Islamic 
party to achieve national power by democratic means in the Muslim world. 
Regrettably, its leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has in recent times come to 
abuse the structures of democracy and to harass and persecute his enemies, 
but he has technically not yet stepped outside of the democratic framework 
of elected leader. 
- Pakistan: Pakistan’s politics have always been deeply imbued with Islam; 
indeed Islam is the very founding principle and raison d’être for the exist-
ence of the country. Islamist policies reached a high point primarily in 
the 1980s under the military leader General Zia ul-Haq, who imposed a broad 
program of what he called Islamization, with heavy emphasis on Shari’a. 
Pakistan’s domestic politics are some of the most Islamist-oriented in the 
whole Muslim world, under both military rulers as well as civilian elected 
leaders.
- Egypt: The Muslim Brotherhood came to power in legitimate elections in 2012 
and was overthrown the next year by military coup. It was still in the process 
of formulating its basic policies when it was overthrown. 
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- “Islamic State” (ISIS, ISIL, Da’ish) was officially formed under that name in 
Iraq in 1996 as a resistance movement to US occupation but achieved prom-
inence through the military conquest of significant territory and imposition 
of administrative rule over it in 2014. It also declared itself a Caliphate. It 
declares full Shari’a law and has been highly rigid, indeed brutal in its lit-
eral interpretation of Shari’a, including a promotion of a number of obscure 
Islamic doctrines and practices not normally acknowledged by most Isla-
mists and often taken out of context. Both the West and regional forces seek 
its overthrow by military means. 
We thus have a variety of Islamist/Islamic states coming to power by various 
means. Other than Turkey and its special conditions, Islamists might well 
ask the question as to whether they will ever be permitted by the domestic 
or international order to come to power. Can they have any faith in non-vi-
olent means? If the answer appears to be no, immediate implications arise: 
Will Islamists instead then seek to come to power by force or revolution? 
The answer to this question also has great implications for the application 
of Shari’a law, however interpreted. 
We can see, therefore, how power relations are central to the entire question 
of how the Islamic state in general will be conceived, what its characteristics 
will be, and how power relations will affect it both inside and outside the 
system.
PART TWO: QUESTIONS OF IDENTITY AND TRUST  
IN ISLAMIC GOVERNANCE
Identity may be the single most important factor in examining Middle East 
politics today, transcending in importance perhaps even theology or Islamic 
law/Shari’a. How is this so? 
This issue of identity leads directly into the question of trust in institutions, 
a vital factor in the development of stable, recognized governing authori-
ties and cohesive societies. It also affects the distribution of power and the 
place for Islamists within that order. Rule of law can have no place if there 
is no trust of institutions, and especially in institutions of state. Who trusts 
institutions? The first question anyone asks is, who controls the institutions? 
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Whom do they represent? The answer reflects directly on the central ques-
tion of identity. 
In examining any state a key question to ask is, what is the basic unit of belong-
ing in the state? Do people feel they belong to—or owe loyalty to—a national 
unit that defines their identity and forms the borders within which they live 
and work? Or is it a racial or ethnic community that commands their first 
loyalty? Does the state represent primarily one dominant group that holds sway 
over other groups, or is their some belief that the state tends to represent 
everyone? Is the primary level of identity and loyalty regional, linguistic or 
ethnic, or religious? Is the power of that dominant group considered basi-
cally acceptable, or not?
Objective conditions, too, affect issues of personal and group identity. We 
all have multiple identities: religious, sectarian, ethnic, linguistic, regional, 
political, economic (class), gender, professional, even personal interests or 
hobbies that characterize us. Or are we a global citizen? Among all these 
identities, which identity is dominant? The salience of any one element of 
identity over another is obviously highly situational, depending upon a vari-
ety of circumstances of time, place, and situation. 
Personal identity within the context of the state and society is to a con-
siderable extent situationally determined. First, while I may have my own 
self-selected identity, do you acknowledge that identity, or do you accord me 
another one? If I say I am Iraqi, you can say I am Iraqi Shi’a, hence not part of 
the (formerly) dominant Iraqi Sunni identity. I thus lose a degree of control 
over my self-chosen identity. Others may deprive me of my chosen identity.
For instance, a Jew living in Germany in the post-World War I environment 
of the liberal democratic Weimar Republic around 1922, if asked his iden-
tity, might respond: “European, German, Jewish, male, professor of soci-
ology, from Bavaria (Southern Germany), socialist, an amateur cyclist.” 
Fifteen years later, as Hitler began to impose the power of the Nazi Party 
in  Germany, that same professor, if asked his identity, would have only one 
that meant anything to the state or society: Jewish. No other identity would 
matter and that identity would be a question of life or death. 
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Alternatively, an Iraqi woman under Saddam Hussein’s secular dictatorship 
in the 1990s might be Arab, Iraqi, from the south, an artist, Shi’ite. After the 
US overthrow of Saddam and his Sunni-based regime in 2003 and the sudden 
ascension of Shi’ites to power in Iraq, that Shi’ite identity would suddenly 
become central to one’s relative position of power within society, as well as 
a vital aspect of personal security depending on the neighborhood in which 
she lived. This situation of community is also heard from a Lebanese Chris-
tian writer, once commenting that he was “Arab, Christian, and culturally 
Muslim.” In other words, the Muslim world is his ambient culture. 
It is conditions of chaos and disorder that most quickly and deeply reveal 
basic, gut identity. These are the conditions when my very safety and welfare 
are at stake. What ties will be the ones most likely to provide me with the 
greatest degree of safety and welfare? In much of the world it is subnational 
ties that will provide the greatest security: the tribe, ethnic group, religious 
ties, sectarian ties, regional ties, clan ties—these all start figuring more 
importantly than institutions. Where do you go and to whom do you turn 
for protection, food, shelter, solidarity, with no questions asked? These are 
in reality the conditions of a great part of the Middle East, especially when 
the region is in chaos. Yet this reduction of identity to its most basic compo-
nents also results in a shattered social order in which there is no trust in any 
institutions, only in personal ties. If you are a Sunni having trouble in the 
neighborhood, do you go to a local magistrate if that magistrate is Shi’ite? 
Such sectarian questions, for example, now matter more in Iraq than institu-
tional ones. The key issue then becomes: How can the state build confidence 
in its neutrality and evenhandedness so that citizens will rely on institutions 
to provide justice and security more than upon personal connections? This 
predicament is true in most of the developing world, but even beyond. Do 
African-Americans in some parts of the US, for example, trust their local 
police or legal system for equitable treatment? Do Algerians in Paris have 
confidence in the local security forces? Trust in specific institutions becomes 
a fundamental touchstone in determining which identity is the most prom-
inent one for me. When conditions are safer, when we have greater trust in 
the neutrality of institutions, we will then all struggle to attain broader and 
more universal identities as nationals of a state, or even as human beings 
calling for equal rights globally. 
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For Muslims, one key level of identity (but not the only one) is Muslim—at 
least vis-à-vis other religious groups. At this level Shari’a matters very much 
as a symbol of Muslim identity. What good is belief in Shari’a, though, when 
Shi’a are killing Sunni or vice versa, or when Sunni Turks are killing Sunni 
Kurds? Shari’a may not be of much help in the case of fractured Muslim iden-
tities. Moreover, it may be a barrier of discrimination when a state claims it 
seeks to reach out above Islam to establish an all-inclusive national identity.
The problem facing all states and societies is, then, what basis of identity is 
the most ideal—for the individual, the state, and the world? Among the mul-
tiple identities of any individual, which combination is it that empowers an 
individual to lead a successful life? Or enables a state to function well with 
the participation of all its citizens in its benefits? Or allows for a national 
identity that does not threaten war with other national identities? What is 
the role of governance in helping determine these things? And what, then, is 
the place of Shari’a in terms of religious life and individual participation in 
society and the state?
It has been said that politics and governance are about who gets what, when, 
and how. How does Shari’a fit into this equation? And how do relationships 
of power—and the rules of power—affect these issues?
Dilemmas of Contemporary Islamist Political Thinking
Islamists face a variety of dilemmas in thinking about the place of Shari’a in 
politics and governance. 
First, should Islamists enter politics at all? Is it better first to devote attention 
to da’wa—the propagation of “correct” Islam among other Muslims? Such 
preaching would represent a bottom-up approach; it implies education and 
consciousness-raising, preparing the mentality of the public as the neces-
sary prerequisite to establishing a Shari’a-based political and social order. (It 
is important to note here that most Islamists have little interest in convert-
ing non-Muslims to Islam; their major task is to bring uncommitted Mus-
lims to the “correct” path of thinking and commitment to their religion.)
Alternatively, Islamists can adopt a top-down approach to the implemen-
tation of Shari’a and the creation of an Islamic state. Top-down of course 
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implies a degree of imposition of values, running the risk of adopting an 
authoritarian order, and abandoning more democratic mechanisms. Given 
the long tradition of authoritarian rule in the Middle East, an authoritarian 
approach sadly may represent the most common political environment in 
which Shari’a law might be applied.
Islamists then face the question of how to come to power. Do they enjoy suf-
ficient backing of the public that they would stand a chance in democratic 
elections? In most Muslim countries Islamists have gained a positive repu-
tation for struggling over the years against illegitimate, non-Islamic, incom-
petent, or authoritarian rule. They have been silenced, jailed, tortured, or 
killed in their campaigns against existing regimes. Thus when the first free 
elections are held in almost any country, Islamists tend to win. This reality 
has been a powerful factor in actually predisposing Islamists towards adopt-
ing some sort of democratic order. What happens, though, when they lose 
popular support? 
Indeed, as Islamist parties become barred from politics, or removed by mili-
tary force from office as in Egypt in 2013, the legitimate question arises as to 
whether they will ever be allowed to participate in the political order. In that 
case, if the answer seems to be no, perhaps political violence remains their 
only other alternative.
Still, the true test of Islamist political skill is revealed not in initial, but in 
subsequent elections. Islamists elected for the first time to office are required 
to demonstrate the capabilities of their leadership and policies in managing 
the multiple problems their societies face. Indeed Islamists may often lack 
technocratic experience due to long exclusion from the governing process in 
an earlier era. Yet once in power, Islamists must deliver. If they do not, they 
run the risk of being voted out of office in the second round. 
Losing power in a subsequent election also poses a new ideological dilemma. 
Should an Islamic party devoted to implementation of God’s law be allowed 
to be defeated? The names of Islamist parties come into play here as well. 
The main Shi’ite political party in Lebanon calls itself Hizballah, “the party 
of God.” Can a “party of God” be unelected? And what then are the other 
parties, if not of God? Actually in most Muslim countries, such as Turkey, 
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the Islamic party has adopted a non-religious name—AKP, or Party of Jus-
tice and Progress; or in Morocco, ‘Adl wa’l Ihsan (Justice and Welfare); or the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen, Hizb al-Islah (Party of Reform). These names 
are more in accord with existing contemporary politics and help remove any 
suggestion that Islamist parties have an inside track to God. 
Even so, should the fate of this huge religious and social project of the Isla-
mists have to depend upon the whims of the electorate? Or should Islamists 
adopt methods whereby they remain in power anyway, contrary to electoral 
results? The leading Tunisian Islamist thinker and politician Shaykh Rashid 
al-Ghannushi commented that if Islamist parties fail to win and maintain 
public electoral support, the fault lies with the party, not with the people; the 
party must then go back to the drawing board and come up with better and 
more persuasive ideas. His view represents an idealistic response, of course; 
the exigencies of politics make it hard for any political party to give up power 
readily, unless the democratic order is well established. 
Islamists often brandish the slogan al-Islam, huwwa al-hall—Islam is the 
solution. One could even be willing to accept this proposition in principle. 
Nonetheless, the immediate response is to say Islam may have the solutions, 
but at the same time ask: What are the specifics of the party’s platform on 
education, the economy, foreign policy, trade, the legal and political system? 
Then we can determine whether an Islam-inspired agenda may or may not 
have what it takes to rule effectively. Shari’a offers no clear guidelines of rule 
or policies whatsoever. It may offer inspirational principles, but it is the spe-
cifics of governance that matter in the end.
Islamists also need to decide what the limits are of an elected legislature to 
pass laws that might be seen to contravene some interpretations of Shari’a. 
In principle such a situation would not be permitted; such laws would be 
struck down by a High Shari’a Court, much as a Supreme Court in other coun-
tries might rule on the constitutionality of legislative bills. Yet the dilemma 
remains: How far are human legislatures empowered to pass laws that touch 
upon certain concepts of Shari’a, or on the method of its implementation? 
(Force, violence, arrest?) This question is actually a profound dilemma for 
all ideological regimes, whether secular or religious. To the true believer, 
if the ideology demands certain policy actions or certain structures of rule, 
Graham E. Fuller
28
then it does not matter whether people want it, like it, or support it. In a reli-
gious context, radical jihadis such as ISIS can claim that the order they are 
imposing is God’s order, and that what the citizenry thinks about it is irrel-
evant. People must behave according to such God-given dictates; no further 
justification is needed, nor are elections or public opinion remotely relevant 
to the process. 
There are at least two good reasons why such an approach cannot work, how-
ever. First, the Qur’an itself states that “Allah intends for you ease, and does 
not want to make things difficult for you” [2:185]; and “Allah does not want to 
place you in difficulty” [5:6]. The implication is that the practice of religion 
should bring ease and not hardship. Second, there is the well-known Quranic 
statement “There is no compulsion in religion” (2.256). Both of these verses 
are of course subject to interpretation, but it is extremely difficult to justify 
the kind of compulsion and brutality behind, for example, ISIS’ interpreta-
tion of the Islamic way of life. Finally, from a practical perspective, people 
will not willingly support a regime that delivers death, suffering, and hard-
ship in the name of Islam; indeed that is not the way most Muslims interpret 
their faith. In the end we are drawn into questions of popular will, popular 
desires, and democratic practice, which do indeed present contradictions. 
Even democracies are limited by the realities of existing conditions.
Islamists also debate the degree to which Islamist governance should impose 
morality. All states impose morality to one extent or another. No state will 
condone murder or theft, crimes which were originally included within the 
Ten Commandments in the Western tradition. In Turkey an Islamist once 
mentioned to me that, after watching countries like Saudi Arabia impose 
morality, including obligatory prayers and clothing codes, Turkish Islamists 
were debating how far the state should go in this direction. “Perhaps the 
Gates of Hell must remain open; the State cannot prohibit entry.” In other 
words, in certain realms of morality, some of these questions become an 
issue to be resolved between the individual and God, and not by the State.
Indeed, there is great variation from state to state among laws passed and 
imposed. The US passed laws in the 1920s banning alcohol that lasted thir-
teen years. Should abortion be legal or illegal? What about drugs, and what 
kinds? Sexual freedoms? Even the West limits some sexual freedoms in ban-
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ning sex with minor children, though the exact age of consent varies widely. 
The range of moral issues is broad and involves rights of the individual as 
well as protection of society. Islamists, too, face these problems of how and 
where to legislate morality and how to punish transgressions. The Saudi 
answer, say, to five daily prayers is to impose them. Yet what virtue does the 
individual gain in the eyes of God for doing the right thing out of compul-
sion? Implementation of Shari’a becomes quite complex in this realm and, 
again, there is no consensus in its interpretation. 
The Turkish moderate Islamist party now in power, the AKP, at one point 
debated the issue of whether or not to criminalize marital infidelity. Lib-
erals everywhere were horrified. The penalty possibly to be imposed was 
actually just a fine. The issue was raised not just as a moral, but also as a 
social concern. Just as drugs and alcohol create huge social dislocations, so 
do broken families. If the law complicates casual marital infidelity and the 
damage it causes to the family structure (their argument ran), then that is 
in the greater social interest. The argument is intriguing, but in the end the 
issue was dropped. 
Ultimately, despite all the public controversy over morality and punish-
ments, public opinion polls seem to indicate that most Muslims are far 
more concerned about the quality of life and governance than they are about 
moral issues relating to Shari’a. In principle Shari’a law is viewed as a posi-
tive virtue, but questions of employment, welfare, medical facilities, educa-
tion, personal freedoms, and the right to speak out rate more highly than 
questions of Islamic legitimacy as perceived by the ‘ulama (clerics).
Islamists who have an interest in governing will have to learn to excel in the 
arts of management and governance if they wish to remain elected; piety is 
simply not enough. Indeed, one of the primary reasons for the success of the 
Turkish AKP was that it excelled in managing municipalities: garbage was 
collected, bureaucrats were responsive, life improved. These material and 
practical issues are the criteria in most societies for good governance rather 
than moral posturing. Yet, even in US politics, moral issues or moral postur-
ing do play significant roles in presidential campaigns, though not as much 
as do pocketbook issues. 
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Shaykh Rashid al-Ghannushi in Tunisia also once remarked that it would 
be a tragedy if Islamists came to power, imposed Islamic values, failed 
to rule competently, and the people ultimately ended up “hating” Islam. 
One wonders whether aspects of this concern do not apply to Saudi Arabia or 
Iran in certain areas as well.
Preservation of ideological purity too, remains a concern in many Islamist 
movements. To what extent does mere entry into politics corrupt the purity 
of their vision, or compel compromise? Should Islamists join in coalitions 
with other parties whose overall goals may be antithetical to Islamists, such 
as a socialist or communist party, even where transient tactical agreement 
might exist on a specific issue? Here, then, the realm of compromise thus 
enters into the equation; yet this is probably a valuable experience for Isla-
mists who wish to participate in politics but must do so on a realistic basis. 
Proclamation of an Islamic state raises further issues about the role of cler-
ics in politics. Interestingly, the majority of Islamist leaders are not cler-
ics or students of Islamic theology. They tend to be engineers, doctors, or 
technicians of various kinds. This in itself is an interesting phenomenon 
since it suggests that when an individual has had only limited exposure to 
the humanities—philosophy, psychology, sociology, political science—he 
tends to adopt a “systems approach” to governance: All it takes is a good 
blueprint—a divinely-inspired set of rules—in order to implement the good 
society, and the rest will take care of itself. A strictly technical education 
might make less allowance for human foibles and drives that constitute the 
really complicating factors in any political system. In short, even if one talks 
about Shari’a, more questions about implementation arise than are solved by 
the concept. Human, administrative, and managerial skills and experience 
are required in any system to make it work. 
Should clerics then provide leadership in Islamist states? In most Sunni Isla-
mist states they have not. The “Islamic State” or ISIS is quite conspicuous in 
its leadership by a man who possesses serious theological credentials and 
proclaims himself a Caliph. Mullah Omar, former leader of the Taliban, was 
also a prominent cleric. Yet Sunni states have historically—while usually led 
by leaders of “secular” background (tribal or military)—also maintained a 
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body of ‘ulama or Islamic scholars whose duty it was to advise on religious 
questions and provide religious legitimacy to the leadership. Not surpris-
ingly, it was easy for such state-owned ‘ulama to be corrupted or suborned 
by power, as well as discouraged from criticizing the leader who fed them.
Shi’ite tradition foresaw this dilemma early on, since the earliest experi-
ence of Shi’a with Sunni power centers was a negative one; they watched the 
descendants of the Prophet sidelined from the office of the Caliphate as a 
result of politics and power. Shi’ite religious tradition thus has suspicions 
about the corrupting character of power. The Shi’ite “quietist tradition” 
among many Ayatollahs preferred clerics to remain outside the power struc-
ture, to avoid involvement in day-to-day politics and administration, and to 
only speak out on major issues of governance in general terms on critical 
issues in order to help keep the political process on a wise track. Ironically 
it was Grand Ayatollah Khomeini, the leading figure in the foundation of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979, who advocated the revolutionary thesis 
within Shi’ite theology of Velayat-e-Faqih or “Rule of the Jurisprudent.” Turn-
ing traditional Shi’ite jurisprudence on its head, the clergy under this system 
came to dominate the political order in Iran. Indeed, just as the tradition had 
feared, it quickly led to the corruption of the clerics through proximity to 
power and involvement in its everyday affairs.
As a consequence, Islamists are still left with the question of the role of 
clerics or jurisprudents within the Islamic state. Some clerics indeed might 
also happen to make good politicians or administrators, but in principle 
their training makes it less likely. The practical day-to-day elements of good 
governance and policy-making are in no way guaranteed simply because of 
accepting Shari’a law as such—its guidance is far too generalized. In fact, 
the reality is that governance in the Muslim world has shown no signs of 
improvement even as clerics grew more deeply involved in politics or sought 
to apply Shari’a more intensely. It seems that Shari’a, while providing a moral 
framework, is not in itself is enough to guarantee good governance.
Most of this discussion has been about theory in the interpretation and prac-
tice of Islam. In the end, though, does Islam itself really matter in this dis-
cussion of governance, power, and ideology? A good case can be made that 
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power struggles and communal conflict are a given in all human politics; we 
do not need the explanatory power of Islam to elucidate them. As a matter of 
fact, most of these same questions and dilemmas would exist in governance 
without Islam. (I elaborate on these arguments in considerable detail, both 
historical and present, in my book A World Without Islam [Little Brown, 2011].) 
Islam in that case can be seen as simply providing a banner, an ideology 
behind which power relationships contend. In this context, Islam primar-
ily serves to lend cultural flavor and character to broader, more universal 
human issues. 
As a result, if Islam were excluded from the picture, would not conflicting 
communities find other grounds for strife? The Shi’a-Sunni conflict, for 
example, has deep roots in power relationships and regional power strug-
gles; it even carries ethnic overtones of Arab versus Persian. Reformers who 
struggle against authoritarian rule in the Middle East would not require spe-
cifically Islamic justifications by which to condemn existing regimes; ideo-
logical arguments always abound. From this perspective, issues of Shari’a 
might perhaps be considered as little more than the turf or the cultural 
framework within which power groups contend, using religious arguments 
to justify their cause.
How much, perhaps, is the debate over Shari’a law and secular law simply an 
empty argument over the longer term, especially when it can be argued that 
neither of these systems in themselves is guaranteed to deliver good gov-
ernance? In fact, the increasing participation of Islam in the political order 
has forced a rapid evolution of political thinking within it. When Islamism 
is out of power, it actually enjoys a certain luxury. It can argue indefinitely 
about theology, Shari’a, what is legal and what is not, or whether democracy 
and parliaments are compatible with Islam. As Islam enters the political 
realm, however, the pressures to adapt to the multiple realities of contem-
porary political life force an accelerated evolution in Islamic political think-
ing. Islamic thinking becomes forced into more nuanced considerations, 
much more so than if it had simply focused upon the realm of traditional 
family law. We see examples of this change in the surprising willingness of 
Egyptian Salafis to enter the election process in 2011, which they had once 
condemned as non-Islamic: They realized that the democratic process was 
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going to adjudicate power relationships into the future and that if they did 
not participate, they would find themselves losing out in that arena. 
Objective conditions also exert major impact in determining the degree of 
radicalism or violence that is introduced into political Islam. There can be 
no doubt that the American “Global War on Terror” (with its destruction of 
the Afghan and Iraqi states) and the deep conflict within Somalia and Yemen 
(even prior to the Arab Spring) have stirred up violent local opposition to US 
warfare, with its use of drones, proxy forces (Ethiopians in Somalia), and US 
occupation of those countries—all this had a massive radicalizing impact 
upon Salafi and jihadi groups in the region. Extreme political violence 
imposed on these countries has created major social turmoil, displacement 
of local populations, and the creation of a flow of refugees both internal and 
external. The resulting chaos inflamed populations and offered openings 
to radical militia that would otherwise not have been possible. In this way, 
doctrine is deeply affected by objective circumstances unrelated specifically 
to Islam. 
Finally, under conditions of chaos ( fawdha) there is a tendency for people to 
retreat to core minimalist goals in which sheer survival becomes the top pri-
ority. As the 14th-century Islamic scholar in Syria, Ibn Taymiyya, observed, 
chaos is worse than oppressive rule—a profoundly conservative doctrine, 
reflected also in the thinking of Thomas Hobbes some two centuries later. 
Chaos and the struggle for survival do not offer conditions conducive to crea-
tive thinking in politics or to liberal interpretation of religion; communities 
instead hunker down and cling to basics, asserting their identity. This reac-
tion is perfectly exemplified by the Chechens in 2000 who, during the savage 
Russian destruction of all of Grozny, embraced full Shari’a law including the 
classical physical punishments (hudud) as an act of cultural-religious defi-
ance against their non-Muslim Russian oppressors.
Innovative thought in the interpretation of Islam and Shari’a in governance 
is therefore not likely to emerge under the present conditions of most of the 
Middle East. Turkey and Iran are the two leading candidates for providing 
contemporary interpretations of Islam. Even so, Islam will never be absent 
from the political arena in the Muslim world, regardless of the degree to 
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which secular thinking also spreads within Islamic societies. It will always 
provide a political vocabulary and cultural framework in political thought, 
just as Confucianism will always be a part of Chinese political thinking. And 
Muslims in the West possess the unique opportunity of having the security 
and freedom to contribute heavily to the process of new thinking in  Muslims’ 
understanding of their own religion.
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Perspectives on the Sunni-Shi’ite Sectarian Conflict
Some degree of rivalry has always existed between Shi’a and Sunnis in Islam. 
The conflict waxes and wanes. Over history, however, coexistence rather 
than conflict has been much more the rule. 
Nevertheless, this century seems to have ushered in a renewed and viru-
lent phase of Sunni-Shi’ite conflict. While the causes are multiple, the new 
outbreak was most immediately sparked by the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, 
which precipitated a sea change in the balance between Sunni and Shi’ite 
power in the eastern Arab world. Iraqi Arab Sunnis, who had long consti-
tuted the ruling minority within the state, lost control of the state with the 
overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’th regime. Shortly thereafter the Iraqi 
Shi’a gained dominance over the new Iraqi government through new and 
free elections that reflected their majority status in the country. The reper-
cussions of this power reversal across the region were powerful and are still 
far from over. Forces unleashed by the Arab Spring starting in 2011 further 
exacerbated this new sectarian confrontation.
Yet the actual character of this sectarian conflict is mostly not about Sunni 
and Shi’ite theology. We need to explore the roots of this old split in the Mus-
lim world in order to understand how they affect present circumstances—
which currently have culminated in a major anti-Iran, anti-Shi’ite campaign 
most directly by Saudi Arabia. This confrontation is driven by far more than 
religious issues. 
First, a few basic facts: The Shi’a today make up perhaps some 13 percent of 
all Muslims worldwide. They tend to be concentrated in a population belt 
stretching from Syria, Iraq, the Persian Gulf, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
and India (where Shi’a make up as much as 25 to 30 percent of the overall 
Muslim population).
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ORIGINS OF THE CONFLICT
The actual origin of the conflict is straightforward: It stems from a factional 
struggle between two groups over succession to the leadership of the new 
Muslim community after the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 CE. 
This successor (Caliph, or Khalifa in Arabic) would represent the political 
leadership of the new community, but would have no prophetic function. 
As the first, victorious group, the Sunnis advocated the selection of a succes-
sor from among leading notables of the Muslim community. These notables 
included heavy representation from the dominant Quraysh tribe that, at an 
earlier juncture, had actually perceived the Prophet’s mission as a threat 
to their authority and had fought the new Muslim community. The second 
group advocated transmission of the leadership via the Prophet’s bloodline, in 
this case, to ‘Ali, an early convert, close confidant and the Prophet’s son-in-
law. This group was known as the “partisans” (shi’a) of ‘Ali.
‘Ali was passed over three times in favor of non-bloodline Caliphs but was 
finally selected as the fourth Caliph. With the eventual assassination of 
‘Ali, however, leadership of the new Muslim community came quickly to be 
dominated by Sunnis who held military power. In a traumatic and fateful 
moment the grandson of ‘Ali was “martyred” in a military battle over leader-
ship of the community—an event forever commemorated across the Shi’ite 
world in the annual mass grieving ceremonies during the month of ‘Ashura. 
(Such power struggles over religious authority are of course well known in 
the annals of the bloody conflict over control of the Papacy in the Christian 
tradition, too.)
Once the Muslim community had split and blood had been shed over the 
succession issue, the two communities began to diverge over time; each 
community—as communities tend to do—gradually took on specific 
characteristics: lore, tradition, literature, myths, community rituals, and 
celebrations. Thus the original issue of succession to the Prophet was no 
longer a live question, but evolved into a rivalry between communities. (We 
can likewise see this in Western history with the evolution of distinctive, 
rival Catholic and Protestant communities—at odds more over questions of 
power and authority than over theology.) Both Muslim communities wor-
shipped the same God, shared the same Qur’an, and large numbers of the 
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same traditions of the words and deeds of the Prophet (Hadith). The Shi’a, 
however, additionally venerated ‘Ali, an act which, according to strict Sunni 
interpretation, was blasphemous; many Shi’a were believed to curse the ear-
liest Caliphs, especially ‘Umar, for his early opposition to the Prophet before 
the new Muslim community was formed. The Shi’a additionally venerated a 
tradition of successor Imams from the bloodline of the Prophet through ‘Ali, 
and even developed a mystical view of the lives of these successors and their 
transcendent spiritual roles. There were up to eleven such revered “Imams” 
or successors to ‘Ali, representing different schools of theology in Shi’ism. 
These schools variously venerated either the fifth, seventh, or twelfth Imam 
(to come); this latter school constitutes the major Shi’ite tradition today (the 
so-called “Twelvers” in Iran.) There is no strong tradition of conflict among 
these Shi’ite schools.
Additionally, although ‘Ali himself is the founding figure of the Shi’ite tra-
dition, he also happens to be held in deep esteem by many Sunnis, who see 
him as an early, brave (“lion-hearted”), and loyal follower of the Prophet from 
the earliest days, a man whose writings and poetry on moral issues is widely 
regarded. It is not that Sunnis dislike ‘Ali; they object to Shi’ite veneration of 
him which is seen by some as blasphemous, as shirk, for any sharing of pure 
devotion to the one God. (Even the Prophet himself is not to be revered or 
worshipped in strict Salafi/Wahhabi Islam. There is to be no intermediary 
in man’s relationship with God.) Caliphs in the Sunni tradition have largely 
been de facto power-holders (sultans, kings, emirs) within the Sunni com-
munity and not often so venerated.
The strong Shi’ite reverence for ‘Ali is regarded with particular suspicion and 
hatred by fundamentalist Sunnis (Salafis), who blame the Shi’a for the early 
and terrible split in the facade of unity of Islam. These Salafis, particularly in 
the Saudi version of Wahhabism, display an additional hatred for any kind of 
mysticism or saints, or Sufi (mystical) religious tradition, or miracles. Wah-
habis even destroyed the very tomb of the Prophet himself in later centuries 
lest the Prophet’s grave should become a site of pilgrimage, or an object of 
worship and reverence in its own right.
Questions of ethnicity also crept into the Sunni-Shi’ite schism. In a perhaps 
strangely contemporary perspective, Islam as a faith has little tolerance for 
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ethnic difference. The Qur’an says “Truly, the noblest of you with God is the 
most pious.” (Quran, 49:13) The Prophet Muhammad is reported to have 
said: “O people! … An Arab is not better than a non-Arab and a non-Arab is 
not better than an Arab, and a red (i.e. white tinged with red) person is not 
better than a black person and a black person is not better than a red person, 
except in piety.”
However, since Islam began in the heart of the Arabian Peninsula, there 
was a tendency among some early Arab Muslims to assume that—just as 
the Jews had Judaism as their own religion, making them God’s chosen peo-
ple—Islam was God’s religion for the Arabs. Yet orthodox Islam fought this 
racial concept persistently. Nonetheless, fairly early on with the spread of 
Islam to Persian-speaking regions, some Arabs assumed they themselves 
were the “truer” Muslims since the message of Islam had been delivered in 
Arabic and to an Arab. There was some tendency toward jockeying for power 
and position in the newly emerging empire on an ethnic basis; Shi’ism, as 
an alternative community and religious tradition to the Sunni power struc-
ture, thus proved attractive to many non-Arabs. These events tended to lend 
a tinge of ethnicity to matters of religion. The superiority of Arabs as the first 
Muslims even today remains a subtle prejudice among some Arab Muslims. 
Islam itself is very clear, however, in rejecting any element of ethnicity or 
race—in principle—as playing any role in Islam and the Islamic community. 
The Shi’ite branch of Islam itself is hardly monolithic; as we noted, there 
are at least four major schools distinguished primarily by which early Imam 
(and descendant of the Prophet) they hold as their guide. This includes fol-
lowers of the fifth Imam (Zaydis or “Fivers”), Isma’ilis (or “Seveners”), and 
Ja’faris (“Twelvers,” the largest single group). Alawites in Syria also represent 
a heterodox form of Shi’ism. These schools are rarely in serious conflict with 
one another, though, while anti-Shi’ite pressures from Sunnis also serve to 
stimulate a greater unity among these Shi’ite schools.
Shi’ism and Power: As with all religions, the power of religious belief as a 
motivating human force is too important to be ignored by political lead-
ers; they regularly seek to press it into the service of the ruling authority. 
Because of hostility of the Sunni state—the overwhelmingly dominant force 
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in the first half-century of Islam—Shi’ite political thinking developed an 
early suspicion of the flawed moral nature of the State that seemed to be 
driven more by power than religious impulse. Shi’a also recognized the cor-
rupting quality of proximity to power. Whereas Sunni clerics often played a 
major role in providing the religious support and justification to the actions 
of rulers, some traditions of Shi’ism instinctively warned clerics away from 
too close association with power (as state-supported clergy) as a potentially 
corrupting element. Some Shi’ite clerics often took the position of standing 
aloof from day-to-day politics of the state, choosing to intervene or speak 
out on political issues only on the most important of occasions, and only in 
speaking of general principles. This tradition of political distance came to 
be known as the “quietist tradition”; in principle it shielded clerics from the 
corrupting force of power and the state. 
In point of fact, when the Ayatollah Khomeini, in exile before the Iranian 
Revolution in the 1970s, began to espouse his revolutionary theories of the 
Rule of the Jurisprudent (Velayat-e-Faqih), he turned Shi’ite thinking on its 
head in calling for an Islamic state in which the clerics would actually rule. 
As noted earlier, true to the long-held fears that such proximity could easily 
lead to the corruption of the clergy, that is what happened in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, where corruption of the state clergy has been a major bane 
of the Iranian State. 
Shi’a of course had come to power in various places and times in Muslim his-
tory, though usually in smaller local states and ruling dynasties, especially 
in the Indian sub-continent. The really major exception was the spectacu-
lar Fatimid Dynasty, an Isma’ili Shi’ite dynasty, which ruled from Cairo in 
a Caliphate that lasted for some 250 years beginning in 900 CE; it came to 
span all of North Africa and Red Sea coast of Arabia. It also produced some 
of the greatest glories of Islamic architecture in Cairo and elsewhere. All 
Arabs share in their pride of this Caliphate, despite its Shi’ite character—
and indeed its “Shi’ite character” is usually overlooked or even forgotten in 
popular Sunni admiration for the Fatimids. The Shi’a never again attained 
major state power over such a large region for an enduring time until the 
16th century in Iran—despite many smaller and often short-lived dynasties 
or families in southern India and in Iran. 
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Iran is popularly assumed to have “always” been a Shi’ite state, but the sur-
prising fact is that it did not adopt Shi’ism as a state religion until as recently 
as 1500, when the Safavid Dynasty came to power. Anxious to assert their 
Persian distinctiveness against the dominant, powerful, Turkish-oriented—
and Sunni—Ottoman Empire, the early Safavid rulers embraced Shi’ism to 
highlight their dramatic political difference from Ottoman power. Interest-
ingly, at the time Persia was very poorly informed about Shi’ite practice. As 
a result, it was compelled to reach out to the distinguished body of Shi’ite 
clerics long resident in Lebanon. They supplied Iran with a group of religious 
scholars who could instruct the Iranian Sunni population in the basic prin-
ciples of Shi’ite theology and practice. (Iran would return the favor under 
the Shah in the 1980s when it provided major stimulus to the downtrodden 
Lebanese Shi’ite community to organize their community anew in a striking 
recrudescence of Shi’ite power in Lebanon.) Persia/Iran has remained heav-
ily Shi’ite ever since. 
After officially adopting Shi’ism, the newly established Shi’ite state of Iran 
then fell into a 200-year cold war with the Ottoman Empire, each vilifying the 
other via harsh propaganda campaigns—accompanied by regular military 
conflict along the borders of the two empires. The intensity of this rivalry 
had markedly decreased by the mid-18th century, however. Typically the two 
empires in confrontation were driven largely by geopolitical considerations 
over regional power, influence, and territory. Since that highpoint of Otto-
man-Iranian confrontations, geopolitical (and religious) conflicts between 
the two states markedly declined. In modern times their bilateral relations, 
while sometimes wary or prickly, have been strongly distinguished by a prac-
tical working relationship between them, at present for well over a century. 
Indeed, Iran has sometimes seen Turkey in many respects as a model for its 
own development (although far less so under the Islamic Republic).
HOW DOES IRAN FIGURE TODAY IN THE MAJOR SUNNI-SHI’ITE 
CONFLICTS OF THE REGION?
The Iran-Iraq Relationship
Today Iran still represents the major Shi’ite power in the Muslim world. But 
with the US invasion of Iraq, the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, and the 
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collapse of the long-time ruling Sunni elite, Iraq’s Shi’a, in a portentous 
event, assumed dominance over national power. In every sense Iraq has now 
become the second most important Shi’ite state in the world. It is not offi-
cially a “Shi’ite state” however, nor will it be, since it of course contains a very 
large Sunni minority of both Arabs and Kurds.
Ever since the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and Saddam’s subsequent inva-
sion of Iran, Iran has lent moral, theological, and at times financial support 
to the Shi’ite community in Iraq, especially as it suffered persecution from 
Saddam’s regime. Leading Iraqi Shi’ite clerics regularly took refuge in Iran, 
often escaping jail or death in Ba’thist Iraq. Many of these clerics were also 
schooled in Iran’s religious institutions at Qom. With the fall of Saddam 
and the Sunni regime, however, most of these Iraqi clerics in exile returned 
to Iraq to play a major role in post-Saddam politics. Iran trained and often 
bankrolled several Shi’ite militias, many of which carried out resistance 
against the US military occupation of Iraq as well as asserting their power 
over Sunni militias. Iran has exerted major influence over the policies of the 
new Shi’ite-dominated government in Baghdad, though not unchallenged. 
We should not assume, however, that Iran will permanently exert major 
influence over Iraq. Indeed, over time Iraq may well emerge as a rival to Iran 
in the Persian Gulf on several grounds. 
First, in historical terms, Iraq, and not Iran, has been the leading center of 
Shi’ism over long centuries, especially based in the two major shrines and 
theological centers of Najaf and Karbala. That is even truer today, now that 
Iraq has been liberated from Saddam’s Sunni Ba’th Party rule.
The acknowledged leading Shi’ite theologian of the world is Grand Ayatollah 
‘Ali al-Sistani, who has long resided in Najaf and speaks out periodically on 
crucial political issues in Iraq. He is Iranian by birth (as his name indicates) 
but is deeply established in Iraqi culture and writes in Arabic. He is revered 
by a majority of Shi’ites around the world and of course in the Persian Gulf. 
Najaf and Karbala are shrine destinations for Shi’ite pilgrims far more than 
any comparable place in Iran, especially since the tomb of ‘Ali himself is in 
Najaf. These facts lend Iraqi Shi’ism a special power.
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As a result, it is nearly certain that Arab Shi’a in the Gulf will increasingly 
look to the new state of Iraq as a center of Shi’ism and the seat of major Aya-
tollahs. This comes at the expense of Iran, which will lose its former monop-
oly over theological issues relating to Shi’ism. Such a situation suggests the 
emergence of a clear rivalry between the two states for influence among Arab 
Shi’ite populations, and maybe beyond. 
Some sense of solidarity among Iraqi Shi’a at present, however, is driven by 
feelings of insecurity; they are not yet confident that their emergence at the 
top of the political order is a permanent reality. Certainly the diplomatic 
reaction of Saudi Arabia, for example, has been to suggest there is some-
thing not quite legitimate about the new Shi’ite dominance of Iraqi politics. 
This insecurity has tended to push Iraqi Shi’a more deeply into unwise sec-
tarian politics, moving to consolidate their power within the state at the 
expense of greater power-sharing and guarantees of Sunni community secu-
rity. Over time, as the Iraqi Shi’a grow more confident about their position 
in Iraqi politics and society, chances are good that they will move toward a 
more inclusive order. It is, after all, in their interests to maintain their posi-
tion over a united and stable Iraq rather than dominating—and contributing 
to—a divided and unstable Iraq. 
Finally, most of the Shi’ite population on the Arab side of the Persian Gulf 
are themselves Arabs—although there are many big families of Iranian ori-
gin, now mostly Arabized. They more naturally look to Iraq as having the 
closest cultural links, and of course as the most important center of Shi’ism.
The “Shi’ite Threat”
What is the so-called “Shi’ite threat” that is so broadly invoked in the Gulf, 
most vigorously by Saudi Arabia? There is in fact a threat of sorts from Iran, 
though not in the way it is usually presented by Riyadh. The threat is actually 
more ideological and geopolitical than sectarian/religious. 
First, the Iranian Revolution of 1979 is one of the genuine “revolutions” in 
modern times. Many countries in the Middle East have undergone military 
coups, palace coups, and power shifts, yet rarely anything reflecting the 
same widespread and deep social revolution that swept away the old order 
in Iran with the fall of the Shah. In the political and social turmoil follow-
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ing the flight of the Shah, the balance of politics in Iran was up for grabs 
with multiple popular movements on the right and the left struggling for 
power. In the end the Islamists managed to outmaneuver all other politi-
cal forces and take power, bolstered by the triumphant return from exile of 
Grand  Ayatollah Khomeini. Few other regional states have witnessed such 
a sweeping popular revolution; the event was admired with some envy by 
Arab populations in the region who felt still trapped in many of the old and 
seemingly immutable authoritarian Arab political orders.
Second, Khomeini’s proclamation of an Islamic state represented a major 
ideological event in the Middle East. It represented perhaps the first serious 
intellectual effort to create a modern Islamic state with modern institutions 
while still reflecting Islamic values. The result was a striking blend of a basi-
cally democratic structure, a parliamentary process conducted by elected 
MPs, in addition to Islamic “oversight” carried out by several key committees 
to pass on the Islamic legitimacy of legislation, as a kind of Islamic Supreme 
Court. The very concept of calling the new Iranian state a “republic” repre-
sented a major ideological statement among Islamists, many of whom would 
have called a republic and a parliament “Western innovations.”
A major shortcoming of Iran’s democratic order—at least in the eyes of its 
liberal critics—was the ideological threshold that prospective candidates for 
Parliament needed to cross in order to qualify to run for office. This ideolog-
ical screening resulted in a skewed system that heavily favored pro-regime 
and obviously religious candidates. Yet even within this context elections 
were hard fought; offered a significant range of candidates, meaningful 
debates; and the outcomes mattered a great deal in the evolving policies of 
the Islamic republic. Presidential elections in Iran have brought major change 
to national policies with each change of president. The country also enjoys a 
lively press with a considerable spectrum of debate, even though journalists 
are often jailed and newspapers are periodically closed down, often to reopen 
under a different name. Everything in the end depends on the tolerance of 
the Supreme Leader, that is, the supreme religious and political leader of the 
state who is appointed by a clerical council, not popularly elected.
In short, Iran has demonstrated something of a democratic process—albeit 
skewed—that is not to be found in most Arab states. It was, however, accom-
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panied by socially restrictive laws on dress, public meetings, and elements 
of artistic expression. Opposition figures were often jailed. Still, taken as a 
whole, Iran’s expression of a modern Islamic state offered a far greater dyna-
mism with meaningful elements of democratic process than is present in 
most other regional states—apart from Turkey.
This stands in marked contrast to Saudi Arabia, which claims to be an 
Islamic state and whose constitution is the Qur’an. Needless to say, Saudi 
Arabia lacks even the most basic trappings of a modern democratic state or 
the intellectual and artistic openness, vigor, or dynamism of Iran.
The Islamic Republic of Iran also adopted a radical Islamic perspective of 
hostility toward kingship as an inappropriate form of Islamic governance. 
Islam has never promoted the idea of kingship as such; inherent in the root 
of the Arabic word for king—malik—is the suggestion of possession which 
does not accord with a just Islamic ruler’s power, since that authority should 
remain contingent upon upholding of Islamic religious, social, and eco-
nomic precepts, however defined. In reality, of course, kings, sultans, and 
emirs have been the dominant reality throughout Islamic history, as it has in 
the history of most of the rest of the world. Rule in Islam is made legitimate 
by just rule, consultation with the people, protection of Islamic lands and 
values. Contemporary regional monarchs nonetheless basically feel threat-
ened by this critical approach to kingship in Islam.
Third, Iran extended its revolution to its foreign policy in its declaration 
of a universal vision of revolution, not just for Shi’ites but for all Muslims; 
indeed, at the outset of the revolution Iran claimed it was speaking for all 
the “oppressed of the earth”—clearly influenced by Third World revolution-
ary rhetoric. Furthermore, the Iranian Revolution has never declared itself a 
“Shi’ite revolution,” but strictly an “Islamic Revolution.” It never hesitated to 
embrace the quintessentially Sunni international Muslim Brotherhood as a 
sympathetic revolutionary Islamic force. It espoused the Palestinian cause 
as well, whose population is almost entirely Sunni, and has also supported 
Hamas, the Sunni militant wing of the Palestinian movement. Additionally, 
it has endorsed the Shi’ite Hizballah movement in Lebanon, another move-
ment dedicated to resistance against Israel’s power as well as the Israeli inva-
sions and occupation of southern Lebanon in 1982. This Iranian support for 
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resistance against Israeli power was widely admired by Arab public opinion 
at a time when most other Arab leaders were perceived as timid and unwill-
ing to oppose the pro-Israel American policies in the Middle East. 
Monarchies in the Gulf were also disturbed at the potential impact of revolu-
tionary ideas on the Shi’ite populations living in the countries (shaykhdoms) 
of the Gulf. There are very significant Shi’ite minorities in every Gulf state, 
and in Bahrain the oppressed Shi’a constitute a dispossessed majority. The 
emergence of the Islamic Revolution and the Islamic Republic galvanized 
many of these minorities who hoped that the existence of the new Islamic 
Republic would bolster their own claims to greater rights within the states 
in which they lived, as well as lessen their oppression there. 
During the 1978-1985 Iran-Iraq War, every one of the Gulf states and virtually 
every Arab state (except Syria and Algeria) fully supported Saddam Hussein’s 
invasion of Iran with money and weapons after the Iranian Revolution. Faced 
with an existential threat, Iran in turn supported terrorist acts against the 
Gulf states in retribution. Iranian “subversion” in the Gulf largely came to an 
end after the end of the Iran-Iraq war, but many Gulf states, especially Saudi 
Arabia, continue to question the loyalty of Shi’a populations—which natu-
rally sparks insecurity among the Shi’a populations under continuing dis-
crimination. These suspicions of Shi’ite loyalty indeed contain elements of a 
self-fulfilling prophecy. Some Sunni Gulf Arabs actually refer to democracy 
as a “Shi’ite agenda,” especially in Saddam’s Iraq and in today’s Bahrain—
both places where they represent a majority. To be sure, Gulf state ruling 
elites believe that Shi’ite unhappiness and unrest is a product of Iranian agi-
tation rather than a situation rooted in discriminatory local conditions.
Iran has been one of the few states in the Middle East to routinely defy 
US power and policies in the region—causing Washington to define it as 
a “rogue state.” (In the Washington lexicon, a “rogue state” means a small 
state that openly resists the American blueprint for the regional order.) 
Iran’s seemingly fearless stance against US power over the years is widely 
admired by Arab populations—though not by their rulers—for its gutsiness 
and courage. Syria, for over fifty years, has been the other major Arab state 
to pose long-term resistance to US dominance in the region—not because it 
is led by a quasi-Shi’ite leadership, but because it is strongly Arab nationalist. 
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Furthermore, outspoken Iranian resistance to the expansion of Israel—an 
obvious, yet self-willed US ally—into the Palestinian territories of the West 
Bank garners much popular support for Iran. 
Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia has not been successful in promoting its own model 
of official state piety as expressed in its rigorous, even oppressive imposition 
of Wahhabi norms on daily life in the Kingdom. The Saudi reputation for 
hypocrisy among the ruling elite further undermines the Saudi claim to be a 
bulwark of Islam. The royal family is well known for its profligate and osten-
tatious lifestyle abroad in which gambling, drinking and womanizing make 
a mockery of Islamic public values and respect for Shari’a law. These prob-
lems are far less evident in Iran’s own conservative public morality. 
These, then, are some of the political grounds on which many of the Gulf 
rulers, and especially Saudi Arabia, believe Iran to pose an ideological threat 
to them, far more than any military threat. In fact Iran has not initiated war 
in over 200 years, so Tehran hardly offers a belligerent profile at the military 
level. That so many Gulf rulers claim to find Iran to be such a threat repre-
sents more a political rather than military or theological threat, and reflects 
their own insecurities. Intense Saudi dislike of Iran also stems from the par-
ticular religious precepts of Wahhabi Islam. (Qatar also identifies itself with 
“Wahhabism,” but it expresses itself quite differently in a more open and 
tolerant society that enjoys generally good pragmatic relations with Iran.)
In sum, despite general Arab prejudice against Persians in general, there has 
been much widespread admiration for Iran as a strong self-confident, inde-
pendent regional state willing to resist American pressures. 
The Syrian conflict: The outbreak of an ugly civil war in Syria in 2011 was 
initially rooted in domestic issues and discontents but fairly rapidly took 
on the character of a complex and cross-cutting proxy war among the US, 
Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Russia, in addition to a number of 
minor players. Residual Arab popular admiration for Iran has receded with 
Iran’s strong support for the now harsh and brutal Syrian regime of Bashar 
al-Asad. Turkey’s President Erdoğan, once a mentor to Asad, turned against 
him when Asad refused to heed Turkey’s advice and his fall appeared immi-
nent. Erdoğan had initially hoped that a Muslim Brotherhood-dominated 
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Syria might emerge in place of Asad, closer to Erdoğan’s liking. Iran’s strong 
support for its long-time ally Asad is perceived by many as an anti-Sunni 
campaign, especially by Arab rulers and elites. Islamists and would-be 
demo crats resent Iran’s support for Asad’s autocracy. Nonetheless Syria, for 
all its close ties to Iran over three decades, has almost never acted as a Shi’ite 
power, but as an Arab nationalist geopolitical power that has regularly sup-
ported Sunni radical causes and a number of Sunni Arab nationalist leaders. 
With the fall of Sunni power in Iraq and its new domination by the Shi’a, 
Saudi Arabia decided to strike back by casting its antipathy to Iran in sweep-
ing sectarian terms across the region. Riyadh called for a united Muslim 
front against Iran and has so far created deep cleavages in the region that 
were not strongly evident over the past many decades. It pits the Saudi 
state—a representative of the forces of the reactionary past in Middle East 
governance—against forces in Iran that are somewhat more representative 
of future regional governance: non-sectarianism against sectarianism and 
a trend towards democracy rather than authoritarianism. In this regard, 
 Turkey is not a natural ally of Saudi Arabia, either, despite all of Riyadh’s 
efforts to enlist Ankara in the anti-Shi’ite campaign. Turkey represents the 
forces of globalization, non-sectarianism, soft-power, democratic institu-
tions, and secularism. Saudi Arabia stands for the exact antithesis.
In effect, Iran is offering a contemporary version (still evolving) of an Islamic 
state that directly challenges the Saudi model whose main claim to Islamic 
legitimacy is its custodianship of the two holy places of Mecca and Medina. 
Indeed, the Saudi king uses this as his chief legitimizing designation, not 
the title of King of Saudi Arabia.
The royal family’s Wahhabism is furthermore deeply hostile to the Sufism 
(Islamic mysticism) present in the Sunni tradition, but especially strong in 
the Shi’ite tradition. Wahhabism detests any suggestion of an intermedi-
ary between the individual and God; hence almost any shrine to any saint 
(including the Prophet Muhammad himself) is considered blasphemous and 
to be destroyed.
Lebanon: The Shi’a in southern Lebanon have been poor and oppressed for 
centuries under Sunni rule. Yet beginning in the 1980s, the Lebanese Shi’a, 
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who constitute the single largest community in Lebanon, built up their com-
munal power with Iranian help and created a powerful militia, Hizballah. 
Hizballah has impressed all Arabs with the courage and commitment of 
its resistance against the Israeli invasion of Lebanon on several occasions. 
Today Hizballah represents a major political and social as well as military 
force in Lebanon; it is deeply integrated into Lebanese politics. Iran’s sup-
port has strengthened it, but it is not a creature of Iran and is solidly rooted 
in Lebanese society. Saudi Arabia, however, views Lebanon as yet another 
place where Iran has conspired to strengthen Shi’ite forces against the 
 Saudis’ preferred clients there. 
Yemen: Yemen is a fourth major site of Iranian-Saudi geopolitical rivalry, 
especially after Yemen was struck by Arab Spring rebellions. Clear Sun-
ni-Shi’ite lines are not easily drawn in this conflict, however. For the time 
being the victorious power in Yemen is the Huthi clan, a major Zaydi (“Fiver” 
Shi’ite) tribe. They rebelled against the policies of another Zaydi leader, 
 Yemen’s former president of 23 years, who had been under heavy Saudi 
influence. Riyadh has accused Iran of backing the Huthi rebellion, which 
by the end of 2015 had taken over most of the country. Although Iran has 
indeed given some rhetorical support to the Huthis, as well as probably some 
limited military support to be used against Saudi military intervention in 
Yemen, few political observers consider Iran’s modest contribution to the 
Huthi rebellion to have meaningful military significance.
Nonetheless Riyadh perceives Iran’s marginal involvement as part of a 
“Shi’ite encirclement” of the Kingdom and has subsequently conducted a 
brutal air war against Yemen since 2014 in order to restore its own preferred 
leader. Civilian deaths reached 300,000 in mid-2016, with over two and a half 
million people displaced. Saudi Arabia has always considered its domination 
of Yemen to be an essential part of Saudi geopolitical strategy; for decades 
it has dispersed lavish funds to maintain its preferred leadership in Yemen 
despite widespread popular hostility against Saudi Arabia.
Bahrain: Bahrain has been the fifth arena of confrontation between Riyadh 
and Tehran. Although the Shi’a of Bahrain constitute some 60 to 70 percent 
of the population, the Sunni ruling al-Khalifa family has consistently dis-
criminated against the Shi’a and excluded them from a voice in governing. 
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Periodic uprisings by Shi’a in demand of greater rights and freedoms have 
been frequent for decades. In 2011, when the Arab Spring sparked yet a new 
phase of anti-Khalifa agitation and rioting in Bahrain, the al-Khalifa called 
for Saudi Arabia to send troops to put the uprising down. Saudi troops have 
been there ever since, a situation criticized even by many Western leaders, 
including the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. Iran over the years has 
consistently lent vocal support to the oppressed Shi’ite community. The rul-
ing al-Khalifas have regularly accused Iran of fomenting the troubles and 
arming the low-key uprising. While Iran has contacts with some of the top 
leadership of the Bahraini opposition movement, there is little evidence that 
the uprising is anything but a local uprising against long-time oppressive 
anti-Shi’a policies. Bahrain, an island connected to the Saudi mainland 
by a causeway, is now effectively under Saudi domination. The close fam-
ily ties that exist between Bahraini Shi’a clans and the Shi’ite clans of the 
eastern province of Saudi Arabia, create additional anxiety for Riyadh, fear-
ing its own restive and oppressed Shi’ite population. The Bahrain situation 
strengthens Riyadh’s anxieties regarding encirclement by an Iran-orches-
trated Shi’ite threat. 
* * *
In the final analysis it is hard to escape the conclusion that it is the Sun-
nis who have a problem with Shi’ite Islam, rather than Shi’a having a prob-
lem with Sunni Islam. Sunnis fundamentally view all Shi’a as illegitimate 
and rawafidh, or “rejecters,” of the mainstream Sunni tradition from early 
on. Sunni fundamentalists view them as worse than any non-Muslim threat 
since they represent an internal schism. Still, there is little that Shi’a living 
in a Sunni society can do to remedy their problem. When the Shi’a suppress 
their Shi’ite identity and try to integrate into Sunni society they are viewed as 
“infiltrating” and have their Shi’ite identity thrown at them. When they call 
for equal treatment as Shi’ites and insist on their Shi’ite identity, then their 
loyalty to the state is challenged as a threat to the whole “Sunni narrative” 
of history.
Tensions between Shi’a and Sunni have varied greatly over history. Yet there 
is reason to believe that the present state of tensions, now largely exacer-
bated and exploited by Saudi Arabia, will eventually decline again with time. 
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What is more urgent is that Muslim politics must shift its ground: ethnic, 
religious, and sectarian identities ultimately must give way to other social 
identities as the chief element of political and social discourse. Transient 
and optional identities—professional, class, economic, political, and ide-
ological—need to become the primary arena for political debates, as in 
most countries, rather than factors of religion and ethnicity which are not 
optional and are immutable.
In the coming decades Turkey and Iran are the two major regional powers 
that fundamentally do not self-identify or promote themselves as Sunni or 
Shi’ite states, and which will likely be the key external players in the poli-
tics in the Arab world around them. Iran and/or Turkey (and even eventu-
ally Iraq) could well come to play the key role in adjudicating the fate of the 
smaller Persian Gulf shaykhdoms. This will be especially relevant in the 
face of a potentially resurgent and expansionist Saudi state in the future—
particularly one driven by the narrow and intolerant expansionist vision of 
Wahhabism that has sent its militant forces twice in two centuries against 
the populations of the Gulf, right up to Basra and Karbala in Iraq. 
It is in this context that Saudi Arabia, as the regional bastion of Wahhabism/
Salafism, perceives the greater political and social flexibility of Shi’ism and 
even Sufism (Sunni and Shi’i) to be a major challenge and threat to the nar-
rowness and rigidity of Saudi doctrine that represents the ideological under-
pinnings of the Saudi state. The mere existence of Shi’ism as a different sect 
embodies an alternative in Islam that is not acceptable to the deeply uni-
tarian (tawhidi) Saudi approach to Islam, which accepts no straying from its 
view of the one true path. Riyadh has furthermore been willing to support 
violent jihadi groups outside of Saudi Arabia to further its Islamic agenda.
More than in just theological terms, though, Iran also poses a political and 
ideological threat to Saudi Arabia as Riyadh sees it. It has taken political 
positions in the Middle East that are popular among the masses—both 
Sunni and Shi’i alike—offering an outspokenness which rulers beholden to 
the West feel they cannot do. Thus Iran is outspoken on the plight of the 
Palestinians; some Iranians (and non-Iranians) suggest that a Jewish state 
that excludes or discriminates against Palestinians is not a legitimate state 
in the Middle East. Iran has called for an end to the Zionist state, though 
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not to drive Jews into the sea as is commonly interpreted. Rather—much as 
many in the US had called for an end to the Communist state in Russia and 
not the destruction of the Russian people—so, too, Iran wants an end to the 
present Israeli Zionist and racially oriented state as opposed to a binational 
one. Iran has similarly dared to stand up to US power—even defy the US in 
many respects—in ways that few other leaders in the region would dare do, 
even if their own populations wanted it. In effect, through its political posi-
tions Iran offers an alternative, contemporary view of Muslim power that has 
appeal despite its Shi’ite character. 
And of course Iran represents a rival in regional oil and gas production 
and pricing; yet in this respect Iran is just one of many oil (and gas) states 
involved in contentious pricing issues. 
In the final analysis, therefore, it is misleading to analyze the harsh sectar-
ian war in the Middle East today as either permanent or as representing the 
essence of the conflict. Actual theology has little to do with it, even though 
Riyadh has chosen to propagate its geopolitical struggle in theological 
terms. This Saudi strategy is dangerous and destabilizing and has led to the 
strengthening of extremist jihadist groups such as al-Qa’ida and ISIS and 
civil conflict in Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, Lebanon, and else-
where. It is high time to abandon these camouflage ideologies and look to 
solutions for the real geopolitical and (non-religious) ideological issues at 
stake. 
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Islamic State (ISIS)
The “Islamic State” in Syria and Iraq (aIso known as ISIS, ISIL or Da’ish) repre-
sents an extraordinary chapter in the history of modern Islamist movements. 
At a time when it appeared that al-Qa’ida represented the most extreme and 
violent movement in modern times, the phenomenon of ISIS has exceeded it 
in ideological, strategic, territorial, and tactical reach. 
ISIS would not of course exist were it not for the US invasion of Iraq and the 
overthrow of the Ba’th regime there. ISIS first emerged under the name of 
“al-Qa’ida in Iraq,” where its first task was to fight the US occupation. This 
task represented a new opportunity for al-Qa’ida headquarters in Afghani-
stan since it had previously lacked a significant presence in Iraq. Resistance 
to the US military presence would provide a popular cause. 
While both al-Qa’ida and ISIS are jihadi organizations, the differences 
between them are nonetheless striking and rest on personal, tactical, and 
ideological foundations. Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, the founder of al-Qa’ida 
in Iraq, and of what was to become ISIS, revealed early disagreement with 
al-Qa’ida, particularly with ‘Usama bin Laden’s deputy leader Ayman 
al-Zawahiri. There were five crucial differences between them.
First, al-Zarqawi, as an operative in Iraq, demonstrated intense anti-Shi’ite 
feelings; this was especially so after Iraq’s Shi’ite majority came to power 
in free elections, after the US invasion overthrew Saddam Hussein. While 
al-Qa’ida itself is theologically hostile to Shi’a on religious grounds, it 
opposed wholesale gratuitous alienation of the Shi’a at a time when al-Qa’ida 
sought to gain a foothold in Iraq. 
Second, al-Qa’ida advised Zarqawi to be less violent in his general treatment 
of other Muslims. It opposed the lurid violence portrayed in ISIS videos, pub-
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lic beheadings, and other gruesome forms of execution that could alienate 
the general public and drive them away from the movement. Zarqawi and 
his successors, on the other hand, believed that policies of “shock and awe,” 
compulsion and fear, rather than suasion, would be the most effective means 
of gaining and maintaining control over populations.
Third, al-Zarqawi had a vision of territorial control within distinct borders, 
something which al-Qa’ida had never done. Al-Qa’ida saw no urgency for 
the proclamation of an Islamic State until conditions were ripe, when there 
would be strong public backing for such a move. Zarqawi, however, believed 
in the importance of creating a specific territorial presence on the ground. 
Al-Qa’ida had never established a territorial quasi-state presence.
Fourth, al-Qa’ida felt it was highly premature to proclaim a Caliphate, as 
Zarqawi proposed. Again, it believed the conditions were not ripe, and the 
public not ready for such a step, nor did it represent a priority goal, compared 
to the need of building strong cadres and driving the US out of Iraq.
Fifth, Al-Qa’ida opposed the creation of ISIS as a movement independent of 
itself and hoped to keep it subordinate to al-Qa’ida.
Zarqawi was killed in 2006 by a US strike. His successors immediately 
declared an Islamic State, contrary to al-Qa’ida’s preferences. Abu Bakr 
al-Baghdadi eventually took over the movement and declared himself 
Caliph—a major ideological precedent in jihadi history. Unlike ‘Usama bin 
Laden, who was largely a self-taught student of Islamic law, Baghdadi had 
a doctorate in Islamic studies from the University of Baghdad. He had even 
considered proclaiming himself “the Mahdi,” the final Islamic ruler who 
will emerge in the apocalyptic conditions of the End of Days.
In terms of arguing for the establishment of a Caliphate, there is only one 
other main group which has seriously examined in detail the issues involved 
in establishing the political architecture of a modern Caliphate: Hizbut 
Tahrir (Hizb al-Tahrir, or Liberation Party). This group is a movement rather 
than a political party; it is based in the UK but with worldwide affiliates, 
especially in Central Asia. It is pan-Islamic in outlook, looking for the ulti-
mate creation of a single global Islamic State. It produces a great variety of 
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literature and public statements. It is technically a non-violent movement 
that preaches highly conservative social Islam and seeks to slowly build 
a mass following that will one day form the foundation of an expanding 
Islamic State and Caliphate. Hizbut Tahrir, as a non-terrorist organization, 
is legal in many countries in the West. It, too, is hostile to ISIS on numerous 
tactical, political, and ideological issues, apart from sharing the goal of an 
ultimate overarching Islamic State under a Caliphate. 
The nearest likely equivalent to ISIS at the moment may be Boko Haram, a 
murderous movement based in northern Nigeria that controls some shifting 
back-country territory and proclaims itself an Islamic Emirate. Its politics 
are intimately tied up in regional struggle, local politics, tribes, gangs, and 
crime, and it has a similar record of gruesome slaughter of civilians. Boko 
Haram recently declared its allegiance to ISIS, but in the main this step is 
best seen as an opportunistic effort to trade on the ISIS “brand.”
When ISIS first came to major international attention during the jihadi 
struggle against the US occupation of Iraq and proceeded towards build-
ing a state, its rapid conquests and establishment of a crude but functional 
working state were astonishing. It thrived on the chaos and turmoil of post-
Saddam Iraq. It gained a large pool of professional cadres from ex-Ba’th 
Party officials, former Iraqi military officers, as well as from jihadi and 
anti-US resistance groups and from anti-Shi’ite groups who opposed the new 
Shi’ite-dominated government, despite its legitimate election. 
A second contributing factor to the rapid rise of ISIS was the outbreak of 
civil war in Syria in 2011, which provided the political and social turmoil in 
which ISIS could develop a base and draw on anti-Asad Sunni forces strug-
gling against the nominally Shi’ite regime of Bashar al-Asad. Unlike in Iraq, 
neither the US or Europe could be seen as directly responsible for the Syrian 
civil war; blame here must be laid squarely at the door of Bashar al-Asad him-
self and his brutal suppression of anti-regime protests from the early days. 
A third factor contributing to the unusual character of ISIS is the apocalyptic 
character of the movement: its choreographed, grisly executions filmed with 
great professionalism, along with its frequent apocalyptic invocation of the 
End Times. The overall violence of the Syrian civil war and the Iraqi inter-
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nal struggle also helped create an apocalyptic mood; such an environment 
posed some attraction to disillusioned Muslim youth who felt drawn to par-
ticipating in a polarizing moment in the history of Islam and the anti-West-
ern struggle. Indeed, ISIS has characterized US and Western forces in the 
region as the “New Crusaders,” lending a deeper sense of religious strug-
gle between Islam and the West. ISIS describes these forces as a coalition 
of Jews and Christians fighting under the banner of the Antichrist against 
Islam. These represent emotive concepts to impressionable minds. Even the 
name of the slick ISIS publication, Dabiq, refers to a town in Syria associated 
with the Apocalypse. 
All this might have gone on largely outside of public attention and interest, 
within the borders of Iraq and Syria, and without engaging the West. It was 
the theatrical violence as well as the filmed hideous executions of especially 
Western hostages, however, which helped propel the US and the West into 
direct engagement in the struggle against ISIS. Finally, of course, ISIS’ sud-
den recourse to major terrorist operations in the West made it nearly impos-
sible for the West to avoid turning to some military means to degrade, and 
destroy, ISIS. 
IS ISIS ISLAMIC?
This question is highly politicized, and the answer depends on viewpoint 
and even on political agenda.
Yes, ISIS is Islamic. Al-Baghdadi, with his doctorate in Islamic Law, is bet-
ter educated in Islam theology than any other political leader in the Middle 
East today. Nearly all of ISIS’ actions are justified in terms of certain texts in 
the Qur’an and the Hadith (sayings and doings of the Prophet.) These texts 
are consistent with radical readings of Salafism or Wahhabism. They are of 
course also highly selective, sometimes subject to dubious interpretation, 
taken out of context, or represent an outmoded interpretation that would 
be rejected by nearly all Muslims today, such as issues of execution of non- 
Muslims, slavery, and especially sexual slavery—part of warfare since the 
dawn of creation. Baghdadi did not just invent these things. 
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But no, ISIS is not Islamic. It does not represent the kind of Islam supported 
by the vast majority of Muslims in the world today. It does not represent the 
kind of society in which Muslims wish to live. Above all, it violates the spirit 
of Islam. Even Bin Laden and his successor Ayman al-Zawahiri criticized 
violence—at least on a pragmatic basis. For most Muslims and scholars of 
Islam it is not enough to cite narrowly and selectively from holy texts. There 
is a need for a broad interpretation of Islam. The texts of nearly all religions 
in certain places have terrible things to say about the use of violence, the 
treatment of enemies and apostates. All religions are used to justify violence 
as well as peace. The Old Testament is filled with warfare, vengeance, and 
brutal punishments along with inspiring poetry and high moral vision. The 
famous Pakistani Islamic scholar Fazlur Rahman stressed that you cannot 
look just at the text, you must look at the context of passages in the Qur’an or 
the Hadith in order to grasp the true meaning. 
This question of whether ISIS is truly Islamic is not just academic but has 
significant consequences. The question is also highly politicized, depend-
ing upon the intent or agenda lying behind the response. Some Islamophobic 
groups and xenophobes in the West with their own political agendas insist 
on ISIS’ Islamic nature. They wish to project a vision of Islam that is so vio-
lent and primitive that it has no place in the modern world and cannot be 
negotiated with. They strongly argue that Islam itself represents a regres-
sion, a threat to the civilized world in which ISIS is exhibit number one in 
their search for evidence to promote their views. 
Progressives, on the other hand, who seek reconciliation with Islam and the 
Muslim world in general, respond (rightfully in my view) that ISIS is not truly 
representative of Islam, even if it draws from specific texts here and there 
for justification. They argue that ISIS strongly contradicts the spirit of the 
Faith. They seek inclusion, dialog, reconciliation, and cooperation between 
Muslim communities and the West. They argue that the grounds for find-
ing common cause between religions clearly exist and must be the focus of 
attention—not the differences. ISIS should therefore not be taken as essen-
tially Islamic in character. A search for differences between cultures deliber-
ately leads to conflict. A search for commonality leads to reconciliation. 
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THE APPEAL OF ISIS
How could a movement that is so harsh, violent, narrow, and uncompromis-
ing win any kind of support from outside?
We have already noted a number of novel factors about ISIS that have drawn 
attention to it. The use of symbolic terms, like the “Islamic State” or the Cali-
phate, possess historical and cultural power; these terms suggest a dynamic 
new look in Muslim politics at a time when the region is dominated by scle-
rotic, tired, corrupt, and ineffective regimes. For disillusioned and unem-
ployed youth who feel they have nothing to live for, ISIS offers excitement, a 
modern cause, positive action, a riposte to the West that has been oppress-
ing them. It offers a vehicle of action to those Sunnis who feel oppressed 
under the minority regime of Bashar al-Asad—although Asad has actually 
always been a champion of many Sunni causes like Arab nationalism and 
the Palestinian cause. ISIS dramatically rejects the Western-imposed bor-
ders of the imperial Sykes-Picot agreement and proclaims the advent of an 
expanding Islamic state unhindered by the borders of the old imperial order. 
It is willing to take on the West, stand up to Western power, even export its 
own asymmetric power and strike back at the West. It suggests the founda-
tions of a new cultural and moral power, based on the precepts of Islam, the 
region’s religious and cultural heritage. True, it is violent, but such move-
ments always rationalize early violence as a necessary stage of destruction in 
order to give birth to something new, creative and constructive. Herein lies 
the appeal of ISIS to some—admittedly narrow—elements of the Muslim 
population. 
INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE ISIS CONFLICT
As we noted, ISIS was born out of the cataclysms in Iraq, starting with the 
resistance movement against the US occupation in 2003. This is only one of 
the many international forces that now surround ISIS. Indeed, it has become 
the focus of many growing proxy wars in the region that have placed it at the 
center of broader international struggle.
The US, now a key player in the struggle, has been consistently ambivalent 
about how to respond to the ISIS challenge, particularly since it did not wish 
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to become involved in another Middle Eastern ground war. There had been 
many gruesome killings and executions in Iraq and Syria after the found-
ing of the Islamic State, overwhelmingly involving Muslim victims. Mul-
tiple events gradually pushed Washington and other Western powers into 
the conflict, though. Various ISIS outrages had captured the attention of the 
Western media, including wholesale slaughter of minorities in the Middle 
East, the introduction of sexual slavery, and the destruction of cultural her-
itage monuments. It was ISIS terrorist operations in the West, however, that 
tipped the Western policy balance. In 2014 various operations, apparently 
carried out by “lone wolf” actors inspired by ISIS, took place in several coun-
tries including France, the US, Canada, and Australia. In 2015 the scale of 
such operations greatly increased, particularly in France and Belgium, but 
also against other states such as Russia, Turkey, Tunisia, and Lebanon.
Despite these operations and outrages, Washington remained ambivalent 
about what course to follow. ISIS, after all, had also been fighting to over-
throw the Asad regime, a US goal as well. So for many months Washing-
ton was undecided on policy; this situation changed only when it grew clear 
that radical jihadi forces in Syria unfortunately represented more effective 
fighting forces against the Asad regime than did the so-called moderates or 
“moderate jihadis.” The very battlefield effectiveness of ISIS therefore raised 
the inescapable question about what the character of any successor to the 
Asad regime might be. Gradually President Obama came to the conclusion 
that however much Washington hated Asad, any successor regime would 
quite likely be more radical, destabilizing, and anti-Western than Asad him-
self; indeed ISIS could help implant a radical jihadi government in power in 
Damascus. 
Yet there is a longer history to US opposition to Asad; it did not begin in 2011 
with the anti-Asad uprisings. Washington has always disliked both Bashar 
al-Asad, along with his father Hafiz before him, and has consistently sought 
to weaken them politically through various means, including covert oper-
ations and cooperation with Israel going back nearly fifty years. The Asads 
were perceived as a force representing Arab nationalism, resistance against 
Western power in the region, anti-imperialism, anti-Westernism, support for 
the Palestinian cause, and hostility toward Israel’s expanding power. (Iron-
ically, both father and son were also committed secularists.) Syria had con-
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sistently been a key Russian client during the Cold War. Thus the Arab Spring 
uprisings were seen by many in Washington, especially neo-conservative ide-
ologists, as a chance to complete unfinished business. Washington had as 
a result found itself drawn into supporting certain so-called moderate anti-
Asad forces (some were indeed politically moderate but militarily ineffective). 
The entry of Russian air and ground forces into Syria in September 2015 
changed the game markedly—an event over which Washington agonized. 
Washington policy circles have been largely dominated by those who per-
ceive any Russian gain in the region as an automatic American loss and 
strongly oppose any Russian role there. Others, though, including some even 
in the Pentagon, believe that Moscow and Washington share many com-
mon goals, including the elimination of ISIS and jihadi terrorism. President 
Putin, determined to prevent the fall of Damascus to jihadi forces, declared 
that all jihadi forces are part of the greater problem—and that they threaten 
even Russia itself in its own large Muslim areas. Moscow therefore began 
to attack all jihadi forces, even those supposedly moderate fighting forces 
supported by Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the US. US-Russian rivalry in Syria 
remains an underlying factor in events, although both states have worked to 
cooperate as much as possible to bring about an end to the conflict.
Other geopolitical ambitions also infect the ISIS struggle. Turkish president 
Erdoğan, once a close mentor to Asad, grew angered by 2012 at Asad’s failure 
to heed Turkish advice towards moderation in Asad’s brutal (and unwise) 
handling of the Syrian civilian opposition. Erdoğan also was sympathetic 
to the possibility of a Muslim Brotherhood government coming to power in 
Damascus, but this remained a retreating dream as more radical Islamist 
forces took the lead in the anti-Asad struggle, displacing the Brotherhood 
and other more moderate Islamist forces. Since then Erdoğan had grown 
obsessed with the overthrow of Asad and went all out to support anti-Asad 
forces, including even quietly permitting weapons and Western jihadi fight-
ers to flow through Turkey to ISIS and to allow oil from ISIS territory to enter 
Turkish territory. But several major terrorist incidents against Turkey by ISIS, 
as well as unremitting pressure from the US, ultimately caused Ankara to 
reconsider this policy. Indeed, Erdoğan’s strong anti-Asad policies brought 
it into confrontation not just with the US but with Iran, Iraq, and Russia as 
well, largely destroying Ankara’s theretofore successful “good neighbor pol-
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icy.” These policies also drove Erdoğan into an unwise (and probably tran-
sient) alliance with Saudi Arabia to bring down the Asad regime at any cost.
Saudi Arabia, too, in its efforts against Asad, has quietly supported radical 
jihadis linked to al-Qa’ida, despite the fact that both al-Qa’ida and ISIS per-
ceive the Kingdom as their sworn enemy. Saudi Arabia is more driven by its 
obsessive desire to checkmate Iran on any and every issue and hence devotes 
more attention to overthrowing Asad (as a significant Iranian ally) rather 
than to the destruction of ISIS itself. 
Iran in turn is determined to keep Asad in power in order to prevent anti- 
Iranian Sunni jihadis from taking power in Damascus, and to block Riyadh’s 
efforts to create a Sunni coalition against Iran’s position in the region—a 
sworn Saudi goal. Iraq with its Shi’ite-dominated government (since the fall 
of Saddam Hussein) is similarly determined to prevent Saudi-backed radical 
jihadis from overthrowing a friendly regime in Syria. 
Finally, the turmoil in Syria has produced massive human dislocation and 
a refugee flow out of the country that has spilled over heavily into Europe. 
Apart from the mainly Muslim victims from the ISIS regime in the Middle 
East, the “collateral damage” of the Syrian war in Europe has been extremely 
serious. It has created huge policy quarrels; damaged EU governing proce-
dures and border protocols; sparked anti-Muslim and anti-refugee emotions 
and backlash; and helped revitalize right-wing, xenophobic, and neo-fascist 
movements across the EU. This structural damage to Europe may be the sin-
gle most dangerous effect of ISIS over the longer term. And whereas most 
Western military intervention in the Middle East in recent decades has been 
unadvised and counterproductive, the damage now to Europe itself provides 
some of the most compelling argumentation in favor of Western military 
operations to help bring about an early end to ISIS as an “Islamic State”—
that is, as a geographical entity. 
PROSPECTS FOR ISIS
As of November 2016, it seems that the future of ISIS faces severe constraints. 
It has lost major territorial holdings, especially in areas near the Turkish 
border, and the loss of the major cities of Fallujah with Mosul, Iraq’s sec-
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ond largest city, on the brink of collapse. It is likely it will cease to exist as a 
“state” within one year. The reasons are many. It has never truly been a “real” 
state. It has no recognized permanent borders. It has gained no diplomatic 
recognition from any other state, nor does it practice anything resembling 
“foreign relations” with other states, only with other jihadi groups. It does 
seem to have developed a few working arrangements with some regional 
states—if only unspoken and certainly unpublicized—such as Turkey and 
Saudi Arabia, with which it shares common anti-Asad ambitions. 
ISIS is increasingly isolated. The flow of outsiders in support of the “Islamic 
State” seems to be diminishing, as its true character is becoming better 
known. Its economy is dwindling as its lines of communication with the 
world beyond become increasingly circumscribed, thereby damaging that 
economy. The economy itself is primarily based on temporary plunder of 
resources, extortion, and taxation, in addition to covert shipment of oil out-
side the country—an avenue that is increasingly cut off. It also receives some 
funding from private citizens in the Gulf. Western bomb attacks against 
ISIS troops, headquarters, infrastructure, logistical centers, and economic 
installations have further damaged it. Citizens who live within it find life 
increasingly harsh and dangerous and many seek to flee. ISIS laws and stric-
tures are harsh to its population. 
Regional states and forces are now arrayed against it, including Iraq and 
Syria, Iran, and Hizballah’s forces in Lebanon. External western forces such 
as the US, Canada, and several European states are active in the military 
campaign. The subsequent addition of Russian forces to the anti-ISIS coa-
lition has particularly turned the tide as ISIS loses key cities and centers. 
Its militias seek to migrate to new locations, such as Libya or Afghanistan. 
Its days are clearly numbered, although ultimately it will require ground 
troops—almost certainly non-Western ones—to eliminate the last of its 
strongholds, especially its major prize, Mosul.
ISIS AND THE FUTURE
The ISIS phenomenon may represent a significant turning point in the his-
tory of jihadi Islam. It seems hard to imagine that a yet more radical Islamic 
movement could come into being, at least in terms of harshly interpreting 
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the more extreme precepts and interpretations of the Qur’an and the Hadith 
on the ground and in society. That is not to say that there cannot be anything 
more violent or destructive. It is always possible that some apocalyptic group 
might gain control of nuclear materials and could create a dirty bomb that 
would spread radioactive material over a limited space. These kinds of activ-
ities, however, lie more in the realm of the criminal rather than the politi-
cal. Countering such groups and operations requires the same kind of police 
work as surveilling and spotting of any criminal organization. 
More important, though, is the impact of the ISIS phenomenon on Mus-
lims themselves. They are the first victims of ISIS and other acts of terror-
ism in the name of Islam—in two respects. First, they are overwhelmingly 
the primary victims of terrorism in terms of numbers in the Middle East 
itself—both Sunnis and Shi’a. Second, when such terrorist events take place, 
especially in the West, it is the Muslim community that pays the price of 
greater suspicion, discrimination, and surveillance. Thus Muslim commu-
nities themselves are increasingly compelled to police their own communi-
ties, if they feel that an individual or individuals betray signs of attraction 
to radical jihadism or terrorist operations that threaten the welfare of the 
community as a whole. 
Put another way, are there “natural limits” to the violence and extremism that 
the expression of jihadi Islam can achieve? As of now it would seem unlikely 
that newer, even more radical interpretations of Islam could emerge, or that 
yet more radical jihadi organizations would appear on the ground, especially 
in the West. It is unlikely that any such organizations would exert a broad 
force of attraction upon the greater Muslim community, whatever the justi-
fication. 
The failure of ISIS—its own disastrous mistakes and extremism, coupled 
with a growing array of Muslim and non-Muslim powers against it—will 
represent an important milestone. It will never again be easy for a successor 
group to come up once again with the idea of a Caliphate, or a borderless 
Islamic state, or harsh imposition of Shari’a law, that would lend it sud-
den, new appeal. The novelty of the ISIS experience cannot be indefinitely 
repeated, and the Muslim world will inevitably grow more cynical and expe-
rienced with the outcomes of such apocalyptic experiments. It is doubtful 
Graham E. Fuller
64
that the ISIS experience can ever be quite duplicated with the same degree of 
attraction and spectacular character elsewhere as it is today on Iraqi-Syrian 
soil. Violent jihadism has perhaps reached its apogee of appeal in Muslim 
public perception. Once the ideological appeal is diminished, it becomes more 
of a criminal problem. 
This is not to say that terrorism itself has now reached its natural limits and 
will subsequently diminish. It will not—particularly in the Middle East, 
where radical and violent conditions have never been at such a consistently 
high level. Ongoing wars, civil struggles, sectarian clashes, chaos, anarchy, 
breakdown of the economic and social structures—all are at an all-time 
high in modern history. The key to beginning to eliminate extremism lies 
in the restoration of some degree of social and political order, well-regulated 
society, and the existence of trusted, effective authority. Such a state will not 
come about until all external intervention comes to an end, particularly from 
the West. That is the indispensable beginning for the restoration of some 
degree of calm. Nor will calm come right away with the departure of West-
ern boots on the ground; that is only the prerequisite. Anger and frustration 
will take time to subside. Furthermore, local warfare is likely to continue 
in many parts of the Muslim world—as of course elsewhere in the world as 
well. Such local conflict may be highly disruptive. Overtones of East-West 
conflict or the suggestion of a “civilizational war” against Islam may start 
to ring more hollow. Time is required for some degree of political and social 
peace to return. Still, the first step requires an end to the West’s incessant 
role in intervention. 
ISIS itself will likely metastasize to other areas of the Muslim world as well. 
It already has in its small presence in Afghanistan, where it is in direct com-
petition and conflict with the Taliban—an entirely different order of funda-
mentalist movement. The Taliban are about Afghan politics, along with the 
struggle of Pashtun nationalists to regain power in the country. It is a “tradi-
tional” form of political struggle, even if it assumes some degree of Islamic 
rhetoric to justify its essentially nationalistic campaign. ISIS has also estab-
lished a few bridgeheads in Libya, although they remain under local siege. 
In the end, local radical jihadi movements are far more likely to succeed or 
prosper than transnational ones that are not in touch with the local politi-
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cal aspirations of the broader public. In these respects, for instance, ISIS in 
Libya faces the rivalry of other established local movements who know the 
turf and have a stake in the deep-rooted politics of the region. ISIS cannot 
easily compete with such groups over the longer term. Similarly, while Boko 
Haram in Africa now claims loyalty to ISIS, the dynamic of Boko Haram is 
entirely different and is limited to a specific part of Africa where a complex 
of negative conditions are local and ripe for such violence. 
In effect, these issues raise the broader and more fundamental question of 
whether it is ever possible to eliminate political violence and terrorism from 
the world. The answer is, of course, no. Sadly, political violence seems part of 
the human condition. Yet that does not mean that the world cannot achieve 
some degree of reduction of the phenomenon. Nonetheless, as long as there 
are major political and social grievances anywhere, people will invariably 
seek and find vehicles through which to express them.
We can recall the history of socialism, a widely popular political, social, 
and economic ideology for over a century. Yet that ideal was carried to an 
extreme with concepts of Marxism, then Leninism, and then Stalinism, in a 
state-run movement of political violence that ended up murdering some 20 
million people in the name of applied communism and the elimination of 
whole social classes. The ideal reached yet newer levels of extremism, vio-
lence, and death under the communism of China’s Mao Zedong, resulting in 
probably 40 million deaths through various regime-induced causes over the 
years. The apocalyptic, blind, and fanatic brutality of Pol Pot in Cambodia, 
too, saw the ultimate in mass genocide of a nearly psychotic form of “com-
munism.”
In short, any religion or ideology can be driven to extremes of violence and 
killing. In the Middle East it is hardly surprising that Islamic ideas should 
create the foundation for political movements with a “native ring” to them 
in many different forms. Right now, in ISIS, it happens to reach its most 
extreme form. Yet it still reflects to a great degree the particular political, 
geopolitical, economic, social, religious, and environmental conditions of 
today’s Middle East that remain highly negative. Those conditions can and 
will eventually change. Extremism will then begin to find less fertile soil.



